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A well-known characteristic of working memory (WM) is its limited capacity. The source
of such limitations, however, is a continued point of debate. Developmental research is
positioned to address this debate by jointly identifying the source(s) of limitations and
the mechanism(s) underlying capacity increases. Here we provide a cross-domain survey
of studies and theories of WM capacity development, which reveals a complex picture:
dozens of studies from 50 papers show nearly universal increases in capacity estimates
with age, but marked variation across studies, tasks, and domains. We argue that the full
pattern of performance cannot be captured through traditional approaches emphasizing sin-
gle causes, or even multiple separable causes, underlying capacity development. Rather,
we consider WM capacity as a dynamic process that emerges from a unified cognitive
system flexibly adapting to the context and demands of each task. We conclude by enu-
merating specific challenges for researchers and theorists that will need to be met in order
to move our understanding forward.
Keywords: capacity, working memory, short-term memory, development, systems theory
INTRODUCTION
Working memory (WM) has been dubbed the heart of intelli-
gent behavior (Necka, 1992). One hallmark of the WM system is
its highly limited capacity. WM capacity limitations are reliably
associated with cognitive functions such as language compre-
hension, reasoning, planning, fluid intelligence, and scholastic
achievement (e.g., Conway et al., 2003). Accordingly, capacity
limitations are thought to influence cognitive development in
a vast number of ways, from acquiring basic categories during
infancy (Oakes et al., 2008), to higher-level skills such as fol-
lowing multi-step instructions (Gathercole et al., 2008). WM
deficits have been observed in clinical populations, including
children diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD; Willcutt et al., 2005), autism (Steele et al., 2007), develop-
mental coordination disorder (Alloway, 2007), and schizophrenia
(Cullen et al., 2010), as well as children born preterm (Vicari
et al., 2004). Moreover, children with low WM scores (i.e., below
the 10th percentile for age group on standardized assessment
tasks) exhibit cognitive problems, symptoms of inattentiveness
and distractibility, and difficulty with problem solving in acade-
mic settings (Alloway et al., 2009). WM capacity impacts cognitive
functioning and development in multiple domains and popula-
tions. Understanding WM capacity development, therefore, has
implications for our scientific understanding of human cognition
and may enable researchers to foster positive changes in atypically
developing populations.
How WM operates as part of a larger cognitive and behavioral
system is highly complex. Facing such complexity, we must ask:
What is our goal in studying WM capacity over development?
One of the most obvious applications is to develop interventions
that may alleviate the broad ranging negative consequences associ-
ated with poor WM (Alloway et al., 2009). Unfortunately, effective
interventions have proven challenging to generate. For example,
Shipstead et al. (2012) reviewed studies assessing whether train-
ing with the Cogmed program leads to improvements in WM and
other symptoms of ADHD. Across studies, Shipstead et al. (2012)
found mixed results, with some training effects failing to replicate,
and overall more support for narrow versus broad transfer (an
issue we discuss further below; for related discussion). We pro-
pose that a central limitation of previous training studies is that
they are not motivated by theories of WM that specify how this
system organizes itself across contexts.
To design effective interventions, we must understand the cog-
nitive processes and behaviors we study. In this way, we argue, our
theories are failing us: through decades of research we have not yet
developed a robust approach to improving WM capacity, much
less reliably influencing the related behavioral consequences. As
an attempt to help our science move beyond its current limita-
tions, we review data and theory on WM capacity development,
evaluate limitations of existing theoretical approaches, and pro-
pose that understanding the cognitive and behavioral processes
we measure in the laboratory requires a deeper appreciation for
the complexity of the system we study. The empirical database
on WM capacity development has grown immensely during the
past half century. Despite this growth, much remains to be under-
stood about the mechanisms that underlie developmental changes
in WM capacity (Cowan et al., 2010). In fact, one could argue
that such this growth has painted an unclear picture of children’s
performance in WM tasks. We propose that the time has come to
rethink existing approaches to WM capacity and its development.
The impetus to reconsider our approaches to studying WM
capacity is motivated by our survey of developmental changes
in WM capacity. This survey highlighted key challenges to our
understanding of WM capacity development, which we discuss
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in further detail below. Briefly, we found that capacity estimates1
increase reliably over development in nearly every study, but vary
substantially across tasks and domains when compared within age
groups. Furthermore, tasks designed to tax WM more (by adding
manipulation or processing demands) or less (by requiring only
storage) do not result in straight-forward modulations of capac-
ity. These facts raised five key questions that we will address in this
paper, which we summarize briefly here.
DO DIFFERENT TASKS SIMPLY “TAP” WM CAPACITY DIFFERENTLY?
We will show that WM capacity for children of the same age varies
substantially across task contexts. One view of such cross-task
variation in performance is that different tasks tap WM capac-
ity differently. We disagree: in our view, capacity does not exist
as a separable property of the cognitive system and therefore
cannot be “tapped.” Instead, we view cross-task variation in per-
formance as a signature of a dynamically self-organizing cognitive
and behavioral system.
MIGHT TASK DIFFERENCES MASK A CHILD’S UNDERLYING WM
CAPACITY?
Historically,WM capacity has been viewed as a competency that an
individual possesses with improvement over development. From
this view, task differences can mask children’s underlying compe-
tency. In our view, task and stimulus differences are external influ-
ences on the dynamic organization of the cognitive and behavioral
systems involved in performing the task at hand. Indeed, we will
review our own work showing that the number of items main-
tained in memory actually changes across contexts. We reject
the competence-performance distinction because, in our view,
competence cannot be measured and is therefore an unfalsifiable
construct.
CANWE ONLY UNDERSTANDWM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT BY USING
THE SAME TASK ACROSS AGE GROUPS?
The immense growth of the literature on WM capacity develop-
ment has led to the use of numerous tasks and variations of the
same task across research groups. This, in turn, has created the
substantial variation in children’s capacity estimates reported and
an unclear picture of the trajectory along which capacity devel-
ops, revealing how complex the task of understanding capacity
development is. At first glimpse, these facts might suggest that
understanding children’s behavior over development would be
simplified by merely using the same task with multiple age groups.
We will show, by contrast, that use of multiple tasks within an age
group illuminates the dynamics of the cognitive and behavioral
systems we study. Thus, we suggest that measuring the WM sys-
tem in multiple contexts is more informative than assessing the
same context across multiple time points in development.
CAN THEORIES INCORPORATING MULTIPLE, SIMULTANEOUSLY
DEVELOPING ABILITIES ACCOUNT FOR WM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT?
We will describe several theories of WM capacity development that
attribute change to a single mechanistic source. We suggest that
1Note that we use the phrase “capacity estimate” to refer to data derived from behav-
ioral studies, and “WM capacity” to refer to the psychological construct throughout
this paper.
such views are unable to simultaneously account for the cross-
task variation in children’s performance and universal increase
in capacity estimates. If various single mechanisms are unable to
provide an account of children’s performance in WM tasks and
development, might the addition of several, simultaneously devel-
oping abilities do the job? For example, might improvements over
development in both rehearsal and resistance to interference pro-
vide an adequate account of increases in capacity estimates? In
our view, the answer is no. Too often, such theories still treat
these cognitive abilities as separable and independent. We view
performance in WM tasks as determined by multiple, reciprocally
coupled cognitive and behavioral processes that are not linearly
separable.
ARE EXISTING THEORIES SIMPLY UNDERSPECIFIED?
We will argue that existing theories cannot simultaneously account
for the cross-task variation in children’s performance and the uni-
versal increase in capacity estimates. Might increased specificity
enable existing theories to overcome their limitations? In our view,
existing theories of WM capacity are not simply underspecified.
Moreover, we view existing theories as qualitatively different from
the types of theories needed to understand WM capacity and its
development. We advocate a new way of thinking about what
capacity is, how capacity develops, and our global approach to
studying capacity.
OVERVIEW
This paper is divided into three main sections. In the first section,
we present a survey of developmental changes in WM capac-
ity in visual and verbal domains (for more in-depth reviews,
see Dempster, 1981; Jenkins et al., 1999; Cowan et al., 2007).
We then review theoretical explanations of WM capacity devel-
opment, which have historically attributed changes in capacity
to single, or separable, mechanistic source(s). Such explanations
have limited applicability across tasks and domains. Our second
section outlines our proposal that focusing on single mecha-
nistic sources – or even multiple, separable sources – of WM
capacity limits and its developmental change cannot explain
cross-context variation. Alternatively, we propose that a systems
approach is best suited for understanding both general improve-
ments in WM capacity over development and specific variation
across contexts at a given time point. In this section, we present
two case studies illustrating one systems approach to WM capac-
ity development. In our third section, we discuss the challenges
we believe theories and empirical inquires of WM capacity must
meet in order to acquire a deeper scientific understanding of
WM processes and ultimately develop interventions that foster
positive cognitive outcomes for individuals suffering from WM
deficits.
WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Working memory is typically divided into separate verbal and
visuo-spatial subsystems, each with a limited capacity (see Cowan,
2001, and commentaries for in-depth discussion). Within each
domain, some researchers draw a distinction between tasks mea-
suring short-term versus WM, with the former requiring only
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storage and the latter requiring additional manipulation of infor-
mation (for discussion, see Cowan, 2008). However, this bound-
ary is not uniform, with some theorists drawing no distinction
between the two (e.g., Heyes et al., 2012). The application of the
terms “short-term” and “working” memory have been inconsis-
tent within the WM literature and, indeed, may not be separable
processes. Here, we focus on comparing tasks according to simi-
lar methodology, but consider all tasks to fall under the umbrella
term “WM” (see Appendix for methodological details and exclu-
sions). More specifically, Table 1 shows a broad sample of studies
using“simple span”tasks (i.e., requiring only storage) to assess ver-
bal WM capacity. Table 2 shows the same for visuo-spatial WM
capacity. Table 3 shows results from one common type of “com-
plex span” task, specifically backward span in which participants
are required to repeat stimuli in the opposite order from encoding.
Within Table 3 we separate results by verbal versus visuo-spatial
stimuli for ease of comparison with Tables 1 and 2. Lastly, Table 4
includes results from studies using other types of complex span
tasks, such as those requiring further manipulation of information
(e.g., counting objects to arrive at the digits to be remembered)
or dual-tasks (e.g., serial recall of auditory digits while ignoring
visually presented letters). Included in these tables is a survey of
nearly 200 tasks and conditions from multiple studies across 50
papers that stimulated our rethinking of WM capacity and its
development.
One striking similarity across studies and domains is the almost
universal increase in capacity estimates over development. Within
nearly every study, capacity estimates are higher for older chil-
dren than younger children. This strongly suggests a pervasive
developmental change that manifests in a variety of tasks that esti-
mate capacity in different ways. In contrast to the reliable increases
in capacity estimates described above, however, these studies also
illustrate that capacity estimates vary substantially across tasks and
domains within a single age group. For example, consider 7-year-
olds performing simple verbal tasks (Table 1): capacity estimates
across 18 studies range from as low as 1.2 (Hulme et al., 1984) to as
high as 5.4 items (Cowan et al., 1999). Even when comparing mem-
ory for only one type of stimuli – digits – the range still spans from
3.0 (Huttenlocher and Burke, 1976) to 5.4 (Cowan et al., 1999).
Comparing 7-year-olds’ performance in simple visuo-spatial tasks
(Table 2) shows another 27 studies or conditions with a range of
2.1 (Palmer, 2000) to 8.1 items (Wilson et al., 1987). This vari-
ability indicates substantial influence of task details on capacity
estimates even for paradigms designed to assess storage alone.
When considering tasks designed to assess manipulation of
information, results from 7-year-olds’ performance in backward
span tasks (Table 3) are entirely within the range from forward
tasks (albeit at the low end): for letters, 2.5 (Zuber et al., 2009) to
3.1 (Morra, 1994); for digits, 3.1 (Morra, 1994) to 3.2 (Isaacs and
Vargha-Khadem, 1989); and for blocks in the Corsi task, 2.9 (Zuber
et al., 2009) to 3.9 (Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem, 1989). One might
argue that backward spans are more informative when compared
to forward span within a single group of participants. Isaacs and
Vargha-Khadem did such a comparison, testing the same children
in both forward and backward versions of both digit and Corsi
block tasks (see Tables 1–3). They found that performance dif-
fered significantly based on order for digits only, not for blocks
in the Corsi task. This suggests that the influence of manipulating
order in memory also depends on the details of the task.
Potential sources of developmental change in WM capacity are
no less puzzling when examining performance in complex tasks.
Consider children’s performance in counting span tasks, the most
common complex task variant in Table 4. For 6- and 7-year-olds,
capacity estimates range from 1.7 (Case et al., 1982) to 4.4 (Rus-
sell et al., 1996) digits in this task, which is slightly lower than the
range in Table 1. Interestingly, multiple studies showed that small
differences in how stimuli were presented (e.g., in a canonical ver-
sus random spatial organization; Russell et al., 1996) influenced
capacity estimates in this paradigm. Looking later in development,
capacity estimates for 11- to 12-year-olds (still considering digits
in the counting span task) range from 3.2 (Case et al., 1982) to
4.6 (Hutton and Towse, 2001), again showing variation based on
stimulus presentation. What can we conclude from this range of
findings? If we assume that complex tasks require processing or
manipulation above and beyond the storage required in simple
tasks, then we would (presumably) expect lower estimates from
complex tasks than simple tasks. This is the case if we consider
means across studies, but not necessarily the case if we consider
the full range of estimates.
The results summarized in Tables 1–4 raise a critical ques-
tion: what do we strive to explain with our theories? Do we want
to explain differences in means between age groups or differences
across tasks within age groups? Is it more important to understand
why some simple tasks yield lower estimates than some complex
tasks? As we will discuss below, one limitation of current theories
is they do not yet address such cross-task and -age variation. This
is a critical limitation because complex tasks such as these have
long been held as measuring individual differences in adults’ cog-
nitive ability and as robust predictors of reading comprehension
(Daneman and Carpenter, 1980), performance on standardized
tests (Turner and Engle, 1989), and problem solving (Engle et al.,
1999). Furthermore, Cowan et al. (2005) showed that both simple
and complex task measures correlate with scholastic performance
during middle childhood.
In summary, the goal of the research presented in these tables
has been to map the developmental trajectory of WM capacity.
However, achieving this goal has proven a daunting task. In fact,
the vast literature on WM capacity development has created an
unprecedented theoretical challenge: to explain the WM processes
that underlie the universal increase in capacity estimates and how
the very same WM processes produce variation in capacity esti-
mates across tasks and domains. In the next section, we describe
current and historical theoretical perspectives on WM capacity
development.
THEORIES OF WM CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
Providing a concise synthesis of theories of WM capacity develop-
ment is not easy. One key obstacle is that theories in this domain
have been closely tied to specific periods of development, specific
domains, and/or the specific tasks they address. For example, there
is currently a heated debate between “slots” and “resources” theo-
ries in research on visual WM capacity (e.g.,Alvarez and Cavanagh,
2004; Bays and Husain, 2008; Zhang and Luck, 2008). However,
these theories have thus far only been applied to memory for
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Table 1 | Estimates of verbal working memory capacity using simple span tasks.
Age (years)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Bayliss et al. (2005a)
Digit recall [ 4.3 ]
Bayliss et al. (2005b)
Digit recall [ 4.0 ]
Case et al. (1982)
Word recall 3.0 3.7 4.5 4.5
Cowan et al. (2005)
Auditory span recognition 2.8 3.3 4.0
Digit recalla 4.7 4.9 5.4
Cowan et al. (2006a)
Digit recalla 5.7
Cowan et al. (2006b)
Digit recall (auditory) 4.0
Letter recall (visual) 3.2
Cowan et al. (1999)
Digit pretest [ 5.4 ] [ 6.4 ]
Attended digitsb [ 4.0 ] [ 4.8 ]
Cowan et al. (2006c)
Name span (visually presented) 4.8 5.6
DeMarie and Ferron (2003)
Word span 3.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.1
Digit span 4.2 4.4 4.8 5.0 5.1
Dempster (1981)c
Digit recall 2.3 4.4 5.0 6 6.5
Letter recall 3.5 4.5 4.9 5.3
Word recall 3.0 4 4.2 4.3 4.5
Engle and Marshall (1983)
Digit recall, slow presentation 3.5 4.7
Digit recall, fast presentation 4.3 6.1
Gilchrist et al. (2009)
Word recall, order irrelevant 4.0 5.2
Halford et al. (1994)
Digit recallb 4.2 [ 5.1 ] 6.1
Hulme et al. (1984)
Short word recallb 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0
Medium word recallb 1.5 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1
Long word recallb 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.9
Huttenlocher and Burke (1976)
Digit recall, grouped 3.1 4.3 5.4 5.7
Digit recall, ungrouped 2.3 3.0 3.9 4.6
Hutton and Towse (2001)
Digit recall 4.8 5.4
Imbo and Vandierendonck (2007)
Digit recall 5.5 5.8 5.7
Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989)
Digit recall 5.2 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.1 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.7
Miller and Vernon (1996)
Tone sequence recall [ 2.9 ]
Morra and Camba (2009)
Digit recall [ 5.3 ]
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Age (years)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Nichelli et al. (2001)
Word spana [ 4.3 ] 4.2 5.1 5.1 5.8 6.1 6.5
Noël (2009)
Word recall 3.5 3.8
Orsini et al. (1981)
Digitsa 3.5 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.9 5.0 5.1
Ottem et al. (2007)
Similar word recall 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.4a 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.8a 3.9 3.9 3.8
Distinct word recall 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6a 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.2a 4.1 4.3 4.0
Pickering et al. (1998)
Letter recall 3.2 4.0
Russell et al. (1996)
Short word recall, verbal report 4.0
Short word recall, pointing 3.8
Long word recall, verbal report 3.4
Long word recall, pointing 3.4
Wynn and Coolidge (2009)
Digit recall 6.1
Zuber et al. (2009)
Letter recall [ 4.3 ]
Brackets indicate data derived from age groups spanning more than 1 year. For complete details of which experiments and conditions were included from each paper,
as well as specifics of mean ages and ranges and full citations, see Appendix.
aThese results are averaged across experiments, conditions, or groups presented within the same paper, as comparable methods were used.
bPrecise values were not presented in text; therefore, estimates are derived from the data figure(s) presented.
cThese values are estimated from reviews of multiple other studies; see reference for details.
continuously varying visual stimuli (e.g., color, orientation) in
simple tasks (recall or recognition of small arrays) with adults
(but, see Heyes et al., 2012, for one developmental study in this
debate), making it unclear how such theories would address the
range of tasks and age groups shown in Table 2. Theories rarely, if
ever, make contact with a broad range of tasks, domains, or devel-
opmental periods. In our synthesis, we discuss a few select theories
based, in part, on their prevalence, historical significance, and their
scope. Our aim was to present a review of the most comprehensive
and compelling theories of development that have been put forth,
rather than an extensive review of many competing theories.
The majority of theories of capacity development have focused
on the universal increase in capacity estimates, rather than the
variation in performance across tasks and domains. Many theo-
rists have proposed that developmental increases in WM capacity
arise from improvements in cognitive processes other than WM
capacity such as processing speed, attention, encoding, response
selection and generation, and/or retrieval (see, e.g., Towse and
Hitch, 2007, for further discussion). For example, Case (1995) pro-
posed that developmental improvements in performance reflected
changes in processing speed and efficiency, which eventually lead
to more information being stored with the same capacity/mental
resources. He considered children’s experience to be a driving
force behind improvements in processing. This feature of Case’s
perspective could potentially account for differences across tasks,
stimuli, and individuals. For example, as a child gains experience
with counting, she/he may become more efficient at processing
digits and therefore have an increased digit span, but not improve
in spans of non-digit words. Indeed, Fry and Hale (1996) showed
that measures of processing speed in non-span tasks account for
much of the variance in capacity estimates (derived from stor-
age plus processing tasks) both within and between age groups.
The developmental hypothesis from this perspective, then, is that
improvements in other cognitive processes enable the WM system
to exhibit an increased capacity in laboratory tasks without any
change in mental resources.
Dempster (1981) also proposed that increases in WM capac-
ity estimates arise from sources other than capacity. Dempster
classified 10 factors that lead to individual and developmental
differences in capacity into two categories: four were strategic
variables, and six were non-strategic variables. Although many
researchers propose that strategic variables (e.g., rehearsal, chunk-
ing) are a primary source of developmental improvement in WM
tasks, there is little direct evidence regarding how or why strategies
might change over development, and Dempster concluded that
the evidence at that time was not strong enough to support these
types of explanations. For non-strategic variables (e.g., speed of
processing, resistance to interference), on the other hand, theorists
have put forth some mechanisms that may produce developmen-
tal change. In particular, Pascual-Leone (1970) and Case (1995)
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Table 2 | Estimates of visuo-spatial working memory capacity using simple span tasks.
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Bayliss et al. (2005a)
Corsi block recall [ 4.5 ]
Bayliss et al. (2005b)
Corsi block recall [ 4.2 ]
Chi (1977)
Familiar faces, layout preserveda 1.8
Familiar faces, layout irrelevanta 3.9
Unfamiliar faces, layout preserveda 1.1
Unfamiliar faces, layout irrelevanta 3.5
Cowan et al. (2005)
Color array recognitionb 3.6 4.4 4.8
Cowan et al. (2006b)
Letter recall (visual) 3.2
Color array recognition (one item cued) 2.4
Cowan et al. (2006c)
Spatial span recall (no repetitions) 5.6 6.7
Spatial span recall (with repetitions) 4.8 5.7
de Ribaupierre and Bailleux (1994)
Pattern recall 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.2 4.4
de Ribaupierre et al. (1989)
Pattern recall 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.3
Hamilton et al. (2003)
Visual span recall, study 1 [ 4.5 ] [ 6.8 ] [ 9 ]
Visual span recall, study 2 control [ 3.5 ]
Spatial span recall, study 1 [ 3.5 ] [ 4.5 ] [ 5 ]
Spatial span recall, study 2 control [ 2.8 ]
Hitch et al. (1988)
Experiment 1
Line drawings, similar 1.4 3.6
(Named) 2.5
Line drawings, long names 1.8 2.8
(Named) 2.6
Line drawings, control 2.1 3.7
(Named) 2.7
Experiment 2
Line drawings, control (named)a 1.3 3.5
Hitch et al. (1989)
Visually similar drawings 1.4 3.4
Phonemically similar drawings 2.0 2.7
Dissimilar drawings 1.9 3.6
Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989)
Corsi block recall 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6
Kyttälä (2008)
Pattern recall, students with math problems [ 7.2]
Pattern recall, students with math and reading problems [ 6.5]
Pattern recall, control students [ 8.3]
Corsi block recall, students with math problems [ 5.3]
Corsi block recall, students with math and reading problems [ 5.3]
Corsi block recall, control students [ 6.3]
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Picture recognition, students with math problems [ 5.1]
Picture recognition, students with math and reading problems [ 4.9]
Picture recognition, control students [ 6.2]
Logie and Pearson (1997)
Corsi block recalla 2.8 4.5 5.2
Corsi block recognitiona 3.7 7.1 8.0
Pattern recalla 3.0 6.2 8.0
Pattern recognitiona 4.0 10.9 14.8
Luciana et al. (2005)
Spatial span [ 5.1] [ 5.8] [ 6.6] [ 6.5]
Miller and Vernon (1996)
Color sequence recall [ 3.6 ]
Color array recall [ 4.7 ]
Shape sequence recall [ 3.3 ]
Shape array recall [ 4.6 ]
Morra and Camba (2009)
Pattern recall [ 3.7 ]
Mutter et al. (2006)
Pattern recall 0.8 1.3 1.9
Nichelli et al. (2001)
Spatial span (Corsi) [ 3.4] 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.6 5.1
Noël (2009)
Corsi block recall 2.7 3.5
Orsini et al. (1981)
Corsi blockb 2.7 3.1 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.5
Palmer (2000)
Verbal recoding condition (Experiment 1)
Picture series recall 1.8 2.4 2.8
Phonologically similar 1.7 2.3 2.1
Visually similar 1.6 2.0 2.4
Silent/control condition (Experiment 1)
Picture series recall 1.8 2.4 2.7
Phonologically similar 1.7 2.2 2.3
Visually similar 1.7 2.1 2.4
Longitudinal, labeling not controlled (Experiment 2)c
Picture series recall 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.7
Phonologically similar 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5
Visually similar 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.2
Pickering et al. (1998)
Block recall 2.8 3.2
Riggs et al. (2006)
Color array recognition 1.5 2.9 3.8
Simmering (2012)
Color array recognition 1.9 2.2 2.8 3.8
Vicari et al. (2003)
Complex figure spana 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4
Corsi block recalla 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.8
Wagner and Jackson (2006)
Picture recognitiona 3.0 3.0 5.4
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Wilson et al. (1987)
Pattern recognition, 2s delaya 3.7 8.1 14.1
Pattern recognition, 10 s delaya 2.8 6.9 10.9
Zuber et al. (2009)
Corsi block recall [ 4.1 ]
Brackets indicate data derived from age groups spanning more than 1 year. For complete details of which experiments and conditions were included from each paper,
as well as specifics of mean ages and ranges and full citations, see Appendix.
aPrecise values were not presented in text; therefore, estimates are derived from the data figure presented.
bThese results are averaged across two experiments presented in the same paper.
cTwo cohorts of children completed the task at three time points in this experiment, beginning at ages 5 and 6 years; the groups did not differ when compared at the
same age, so results for 6 and 7 years are averaged across these groups.
Table 3 | Estimates of working memory capacity using backward span tasks.
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
VERBAL
Hutton and Towse (2001)
Digit recall 3.8 4.6
Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989)
Digit recall 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.8
Morra (1994)
Digit recalla 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.7 4.1
Word recall 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.9
Morra and Camba (2009)
Digit recall [ 4.5 ]
Wynn and Coolidge (2009)
Digit recall [ 4.3 ]
Zuber et al. (2009)
Letter recall [ 2.5 ]
VISUO-SPATIAL
Hitch et al. (1988)
Line drawings, control (named)b 1.7 3.0
Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989)
Corsi block recall 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.6 5.1 5.0 5.4 5.2 5.5
Luciana et al. (2005)
Spatial span [ 5.0] [ 5.5] [ 5.9 ] [6.4 ]
Zuber et al. (2009)
Corsi block recall [ 2.9 ]
Brackets indicate data derived from age groups spanning more than 1 year. Results reported here were from backward versions of tasks reported inTable 1 (listed
under Verbal) andTable 2 (listed under Visuo-Spatial). For complete details of which experiments and conditions were included from each paper, as well as specifics
of mean ages and ranges and full citations, see Appendix.
aThese results are averaged across two experiments presented in the same paper.
bPrecise values were not presented in text; therefore, estimates are derived from the data figure presented.
propose that mental resources, referred to as M-space or M-power,
are changing over development. Some researchers suggest that M-
space is increasing over development, whereas others believe that
the efficiency with which M-space is used is the source of devel-
opmental improvement. In either case, the primary mechanism
proposed to cause this developmental change is an increase in
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Simmering and Perone Capacity development
Table 4 | Estimates of working memory capacity using complex and/or dual-tasks.
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Bayliss et al. (2005a)
Verbal-verbal [ 3.7 ]
Verbal-visuo-spatial [ 3.1 ]
Visuo-spatial-verbal [ 4.4 ]
Visuo-spatial-visuo-spatial [ 3.1 ]
Bayliss et al. (2005b)
Verbal-verbal [ 3.1 ]
Visuo-spatial-visuo-spatial [ 3.8 ]
Case et al. (1982)
Counting span recall 1.7 2.3 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.2 3.5
Cowan et al. (2011)
Shape-color-location recognition
Silent trialsa [ 1.9 ] [ 2.5 ]
Name color trialsa [ 2.4 ] [ 3.0 ]
Say “wait” trialsa [ 1.5 ] [ 2.1 ]
Cowan et al. (2005)
Counting span recallb 2.8 3.6 4.0
Listening (sentence) span recallb 1.8 2.5 2.7
Running (digit) span recallb 2.1 2.6 2.7
Ignored speech (digits) recall 2.0 2.0
Cowan et al. (2006b)
Digit (auditory) and letter (visual) recall
Attend auditory 3.6
Attend visual 1.7
Ignore auditory 3.4
Ignore visual 1.7
Cowan et al. (2010)
Shape-color-location recognition; two shapes
1-Shapea [1.5 ] [1.9 ]
100% Trialsa [1.3 ] [1.8 ]
80% Trialsa [0.8 ] [1.5 ]
50% Trialsa [0.5 ] [1.3 ]
20% Trialsa [0.4 ] [1.0 ]
Shape-color-location recognition; three shapes
1-Shapea [1.5 ] [2.5 ]
100% Trialsa [1.3 ] [2.2 ]
80% Trialsa [0.5 ] [1.5 ]
50% Trialsa [0.5 ] [1.0 ]
20% Trialsa [0.4 ] [0.8 ]
Cowan et al. (1999)
Unattended digits (visual dual-task)a [ 2.4 ] [ 3.1 ]
Cowan et al. (2006c)
Counting span recall 3.6 4.1
Running span recall 2.1 2.8
de Ribaupierre and Bailleux (1994)
Color/location recall 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.0
de Ribaupierre et al. (1989)
Color/location recall 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.6
Halford et al. (1994)
Experiment 1
Word order, subtraction dual-task 3.3
(Continued)
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Simmering and Perone Capacity development
Table 4 | Continued
Age (years)
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Word order, reading dual-task 3.6
Experiment 2
Digit recall, integrated condition [ 3.1 ]
Digit recall, non-integrated condition [ 3.2 ]
Experiment 3
Digit recall, counting dual-taska 1.8 2.7 3.8
Experiment 4
Digit recall, forward counting dual-task 2.2 2.8
Digit recall, backward counting dual-task 1.9 2.7
Digit recall, story listening dual-task 3.4 2.6
Hutton and Towse (2001)
Digit recall, forward with suppression 3.7 4.5
Digit recall, backward with suppression 3.5 4.2
Counting recall, forward 3.3 4.6
Counting recall, backward 2.4 3.6
Morra (1994)
Counting span recallb 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.8
Color/location recallb 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.2 3.9
Morra and Camba (2009)
Counting recall [ 3.4 ]
Russell et al. (1996)
Counting span recall (simple) 4.4
Counting span recall (complex) 3.6
Odd-man-out position recall (simple) 4.2
Odd-man-out position recall (complex) 3.7
Sum span recall (simple) 4.2
Sum span recall (complex) 3.2
Towse and Hitch (1995)
Counting span recall (features)a 2.8 3.5 4.7 4.2
Counting span recall (conjunction)a 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.6
Counting span recall (feature-slow)a 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.8
Towse et al. (1998)
Counting array recall (small first)a 2.6 2.7 4.1 4.1
Counting array recall (large first)a 2.3 2.5 3.7 3.9
Operation span recall (short)a,b 3.3 3.9 3.8 4.4
Operation span recall (long)a,b 2.5 3.4 2.9 3.5
Reading span recall (short)a 2.9 2.9 3.2
Reading span recall (long)a 2.2 2.7 2.9
Towse et al. (2002)
Short interpolation task (6 s)
Operation span recall, parity dual-taska 2.0
Operation span recall, accuracy dual-taska 2.2
Operation span recall, parity, and accuracya 1.9
Long interpolation task (15 s)
Operation span recall, parity dual-taska 1.7
Operation span recall, accuracy dual-taska 1.8
Operation span recall, parity, and accuracya 1.2
Brackets indicate data derived from age groups spanning more than 1 year. Tasks are not divided between verbal and visuo-spatial domains because many included
components from each system. For complete details of which experiments and conditions were included from each paper, as well as specifics of mean ages and
ranges and full citations, see Appendix.
aPrecise values were not presented in text; therefore, estimates are derived from the data figure presented.
bThese results are averaged across two experiments presented in the same paper.
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Simmering and Perone Capacity development
myelination. According to Case, this is a likely source because
myelination not only increases the speed of neural conductiv-
ity, but also reduces interference through insulation. Although
it seems intuitive that these changes would produce either an
increase in resources available or improve the efficiency of the
use of these resources, no specific process has been proposed by
which increased neural conductivity would improve performance
in span tasks.
Most early theoretical explanations of WM capacity develop-
ment attribute increases in capacity estimates to a single cause
(e.g., those reviewed by Dempster, 1981). One more recent exam-
ple of this type of approach was illustrated by Oberauer and
Kliegl (2001). These authors were interested in potential sources of
aging-related declines in WM capacity. They discussed five poten-
tial sources of WM capacity limitations (limited resources, fixed
slot-like capacity, speed of decay versus rehearsal, similarity-based
interference, and inter-item confusion) and developed computa-
tional models to test whether these sources of WM capacity lim-
itations could account for data comparing young and old adults’
performance on a complex WM task. They tested seven formal
models that implemented these sources (three types of resource
models and one model for each additional proposed source) and
found that only two models – one with capacity limits arising
through decay, the other arising through interference – provided
a good fit to their data. This approach assumes that there is only
one source of capacity limits. Can we assume that WM capacity
would be limited by either decay or interference, but not both?
Similarly, should we infer that only one of these would change
over development?
As the aforementioned examples illustrate, single-cause expla-
nations have fallen short in accounting for the type of variation
across tasks and domains shown in Tables 1–4. For example,
although Fry and Hale (1996) showed that processing speed
accounts for much of the variance they found in WM tasks, there
was still a significant proportion of variance from age that was
not accounted for by speed. Thus, WM performance increased
over development due to some process(es) in addition to process-
ing speed. The limitations of such single-cause explanations has
led theorists to argue for explanations that incorporate multiple
causes (e.g., Towse and Hitch, 2007; Cowan et al., 2010), suggesting
the need for studies that control and compare multiple processes
as well as storage constraints. Cowan et al. (2010), for exam-
ple, highlights the distinction between processing-related and
storage-specific limitations addressed through previous research.
He argues that processing strategies (such as rehearsal, chunking,
or imagery) are likely to vary across task contexts whereas stor-
age limits stay constant across a wider variety of circumstances.
He proposes that future research should aim to control or prevent
processing strategies to gain a more precise measure of storage.
Similarly, Towse and Hitch (2007) outlined evidence for four
sources of variation in WM performance: increases in processing
speed, improved ability to maintain information while engaged
in a separate processing task, increased storage capacity, and
improved response-timing processes (e.g., latency to respond,
pauses between items). They further proposed that developmen-
tal changes in performance arise from the combination of which
processes are accessed and how well they function. We agree
that theories must move beyond single-source models of WM
capacity limits and development. However, our perspective makes
the further claim that multiple sources of developmental dif-
ferences cannot be considered in isolation. Below, we propose
a new view of WM capacity that embraces the complex man-
ner in which neural, cognitive, and behavioral systems interact
over real and developmental time scales. We believe this view
can provide new insights into the sources of both variation
and stability across development. We provide evidence from two
case studies that have tested novel predictions derived from this
perspective.
A NEW VIEW ONWORKING MEMORY CAPACITY
DEVELOPMENT
Our proposal is that WM capacity and its development can best be
understood as a dynamical system, from the perspective of a sys-
tems theory. A key feature of systems theories is their emphasis on
process over representation (Thelen and Smith, 1994). Capacity
has long been studied as a concrete property of the WM system: a
given individual is considered to “have” a capacity in each domain,
which is then brought to bear on laboratory tasks. Indeed, the
fact that Tables 1–4 present numerical estimates of how many
items are held in memory points to this emphasis on represen-
tation. From a systems perspective, by contrast, the processes of
remembering cannot be separated from what is being remembered
(i.e., representation; Spencer and Schöner, 2003). We contend that
WM capacity does not exist in the way it has historically been dis-
cussed: from our perspective, there is no such thing as capacity
“in the head.” Rather, capacity estimates are emergent products of
cognitive and behavioral systems interacting in real-time in a task
context. Emergence – a central concept in systems theory – is the
notion that a given property of a system exists only through the
meeting of components of that system. To draw on an analogy
from physics, consider the concept of friction, which exists solely
as the product of the meeting of two surfaces: a ramp alone has no
friction, as a ball alone has no friction, but rolling a ball down a
ramp produces friction. Extending this to WM, capacity does not
exist alone, but rather capacity estimates are an emergent product
of various components of cognitive and behavioral systems orga-
nizing themselves over time within a specific stimulus and task
context.
Additionally, capacity estimates arise from the nature of the
coupling between cognitive and behavioral systems. Coupling –
another central concept in systems theory – is the notion that
the dynamics of one system depend on and are inseparable from
the dynamics of another system. Consider the classic example of
two pendulum clocks (Rosenblum and Pikovsky, 2003). In the
seventeenth century, Huygens (1986) observed the spontaneous
synchronization of the motion of two clocks. How did this hap-
pen? Both clocks were connected to the same wooden beam. The
motion of the clocks generated vibration that was shared across
the two clocks. The common source of energy – coupling – led
the behavior of the two clocks to become perfectly synchronized
without the need for any outside source of intervention. That is,
the behavior of the two clocks was the product of a self-organizing
dynamical system that emerged from the coupling between the
two systems.
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In our view, capacity in the classic sense (e.g., the “slots”
metaphor) does not work. In the laboratory, we derive capacity
estimates that are the emergent product of multiple, highly com-
plex, coupled cognitive and behavioral systems operating within
the task context. If we want to understand why capacity estimates
appear limited and why they differ across individuals, develop-
ment, and task contexts we must understand the dynamics of these
systems (i.e., how the components of a system interact through
time). We illustrate this claim below by reviewing two case studies
from our own work. Our proposal stands in contrast to the histor-
ical approach to understanding capacity and its development. For
instance, Cowan et al. (2010) emphasized the role of processing
(e.g., strategy) in explaining cross-task performance differences,
while contending that storage remains relatively constant across
tasks. Though we agree that both processing and storage must be
considered to understand performance across tasks, we disagree
with both the characterization of storage as a separable component
of the system as well as the notion that storage is constant across
tasks. In our view, storage capacity cannot be “tapped.” Storage is
a process in and of itself that cannot be considered in isolation
from the processes that contribute to (e.g., encoding, chunking)
and operate upon (e.g., rehearsal, retrieval) stored information.
Below, we present two case studies illustrating how a systems
approach can be applied to WM capacity development. These
studies have tested specific predictions derived from the imple-
mentation of visual WM into a computational model,which allows
for direct testing of how changes in a given set of processes may
simulate developmental improvements in performance. These
examples demonstrate how the specific details of the behavioral
tasks designed to measure WM capacity influence the processes by
which WM representations are formed and used in service of the
tasks,and reveal that capacity may vary within the same participants
depending on the manner in which information is presented and
capacity is measured. Importantly, we do not consider these differ-
ences across tasks to be “noise” in our estimates, but rather believe
this cross-task variation informs our understanding of how this
dynamic cognitive and behavioral system operates and develops.
CASE STUDY 1: INFANT VISUAL WORKING MEMORY
Our first case study centers on a series of neural network sim-
ulations reported by Perone et al. (2011). Perone et al. showed
that a single, complex system can produce remarkable variation
in performance across contexts. More specifically, they tested the
prediction that a single neuro-dynamical systems model of infant
looking and memory could produce variation in infants’ capacity
estimates across task conditions. They simulated infants’ perfor-
mance in a change preference task designed by Ross-Sheehy et al.
(2003) to estimate visual WM capacity. Figure 1A shows this task,
in which infants viewed two displays of colored squares blinking
on and off in synchrony. On a “no-change” display, all of the colors
remained the same with each blink/delay. On a “change” display,
one randomly selected color changed to a new color. Infants’ look-
ing time to the two displays was compared, and a robust preference
for the change display was interpreted as memory for the number
of items per display (i.e., set size). Across set sizes, Ross-Sheehy
et al. found that 6-month-olds showed a robust change prefer-
ence only at set size one, whereas 10-month-olds showed change
A B
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustrations of tasks used to assess visual
working memory in (A) infants versus (B) children and adults; both
present examples of set size three.
preferences up to set size four. They concluded that infants’ visual
WM capacity increases from one to four items between 6 and
10 months.
Perone et al. (2011) simulated infants’ performance in this task
using a model of infant looking and memory. The model con-
sists of a neurocognitive system that encodes object details (e.g.,
color) and a fixation system that is biased to sustain looking during
encoding. Encoding leads to WM formation of the colors in the
displays; once a robust WM is formed, inhibition biases the sys-
tem to look away from remembered items and explore items that
may be novel. The model exhibited a change preference through
recognition of the items on the no-change display and detection
of novelty on the change display. This preference emerged through
real-time interactions between looking, encoding, and WM forma-
tion. Critically, Perone et al. found that a preference for the change
display did not require memory for all items in the display, that is,
the model exhibited a higher capacity estimate (measured through
looking time) than the number of items maintained in WM.
This example highlights how multiple processes working
together give rise to behavioral estimates of capacity. Critically,
the challenge remains to understand how such processes give rise
to variation in performance like that shown in Tables 1–4. Within
systems approaches, such variation is viewed as a signature of a
system that organizes in real-time in response to the current task
context. Perone et al. (2011) illustrated this concept by simulat-
ing a second experiment by Ross-Sheehy et al. (2003) in which
they removed the delay to insure that young infants’ performance
reflected a limitation in memory, not perception or attention.
Indeed, young infants exhibited change preferences for set sizes up
to three in this condition. This manipulation changed the task in
two important ways. First, “blinks” on the change and no-change
displays were no longer present, that is, there were no transient
onsets within each presentation of the items. Second, it introduced
a “flicker” associated only with the changing item on the change
display. Perone et al. showed that these minor manipulations dra-
matically influenced looking behavior. In the DNF model, looking
and memory are reciprocally coupled components of a larger cog-
nitive and behavioral system. Manipulations of looking influenced
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memory formation. In particular, the “flicker” associated with the
change display biased the model to preferentially look to the dis-
play. This had two consequences. First, it led the model to encode
the changing item on the display, which, in turn, biased the model
to look at the change display more. Second, it enabled the model
to encode more items into WM on the change display, boosting
the number of items that the model maintained. Performance in
memory tasks reflects the real-time organization of a system in
context rather than a property of the WM system.
Critically, this no-delay version of the change preference task
does not depend on memory in the classic sense (i.e., maintain-
ing information across a delay). Nevertheless, Perone et al. (2011)
simulations showed that the same cognitive and behavioral system
that captured infants’ performance in task contexts that involved a
delay could also capture infants’performance in a task context with
no-delay. This illustrates the emergence of capacity in our perspec-
tive: in the no-delay condition, support from the task input allowed
for more items to be encoded and maintained in memory. This, in
turn, facilitated recognition of sameness on the no-change display
and detection of novelty on the change display. The result was a
robust preference for the change display. In contrast, the standard
condition is less supportive and places a different burden on the
memory system. The repeated delay slows memory formation for
non-changing items and promotes the decay of items maintained
in memory. This, in turn, led to a different pattern of looking by
the model. This example highlights how a task context impacts the
process of remembering, the number of items remembered, and
capacity estimates.
In light of the data in Tables 1–4, a critical question is whether
such a system is able to produce both behavioral variability across
contexts as well as stable developmental increases in capacity esti-
mates. As illustrated by our simulations of the no-delay condition,
in a dynamical system real-time behavior emerges via the interac-
tions of its components in context. The tendency of a dynamical
system to produce similar behaviors in the same context (i.e.,
stability) depends on the nature of interactions among its compo-
nents (for an illustration and discussion, see Perone and Spencer,
2012). Thus, developmental change in stability requires modifica-
tion in the interactions among components. Perone et al. (2011)
proposed that older infants’ change preferences at higher set sizes
emerged from changes in the strength of interaction among the
excitatory and inhibitory neural components governing encoding
and memory formation in their model. Stronger interactions have
a variety of emergent consequences, including faster and more
robust WM formation, stronger suppression of encoding via WM,
and increased responsiveness to novelty. This impacts how cog-
nitive and behavioral processes interact in real-time. Perone et al.
showed that the same model with stronger interactions performed
like older infants (i.e., exhibited higher capacity estimates), main-
taining multiple items on the no-change display while encoding
novelty on, and looking longer to, the change display.
CASE STUDY 2: VISUAL WORKING MEMORY THROUGH CHILDHOOD
INTO ADULTHOOD
Simmering (2008, under review) used a similar model architecture
to address inconsistent estimates of visual WM capacity over devel-
opment. As described above, Ross-Sheehy et al. (2003) estimated
capacity at one item for 6-month-olds, increasing rapidly to an
adult-like three to four items by 10 months of age. By contrast,
studies with older children using the change detection task revealed
estimates of only one to two items during the preschool years, not
reaching adult levels of performance until adolescence (see Table 2;
Cowan et al., 2005; Riggs et al., 2006; Simmering, 2012). In this
task, a small number of colored squares are presented briefly (e.g.,
500 ms), followed by a short delay (e.g., 1 s) and presentation of
a test array that includes either all of the same colors, or one new
color (see Figure 1B). Participants are instructed to respond dif-
ferent if any items changed, or same if all items were unchanged.
One obvious source of the inconsistent estimates between infancy
and later childhood is the different tasks used to assess capacity.
Without a full understanding of the processes involved in these
tasks, however, it was not possible to relate performance across the
two tasks and development (see Riggs et al., 2006, for discussion).
Simmering (2008) addressed this inconsistency by implement-
ing both tasks within the same neural network model, and then
testing one group of participants (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds, and adults)
in both tasks to compare performance directly. Model simulations
showed how the same memory processes could operate in both
tasks but yield strikingly different capacity estimates. In partic-
ular, the repeated presentation of items on both displays in the
infant task allowed WM representations to build incrementally,
which was particularly important for younger children, whose
memory builds more slowly and is less stable. By contrast, suc-
cessful performance in the change detection task requires robust
WM representations to form quickly and be maintained stably
enough to support generation of a same/different decision.
These simulations led Simmering (2008) to predict that capac-
ity estimates should be higher in the change preference versus
change detection task when measured in the same participants,
but, critically, that performance should still be correlated across
tasks due to the shared processes of WM formation and main-
tenance. Behavioral results confirmed these predictions, showing
capacity estimates from the change preference task of at least six
items for all age groups, but change detection capacity estimates of
only two to three items for children and four to five items for adults.
Moreover, change detection capacity was predicted by a behav-
ioral signature of robust memory formation in looking tasks: the
number of times participants looked back and forth (Kovack-Lesh
et al., 2008; Perone and Spencer, 2012). In particular, the number
of times participants looked back and forth between displays on
set size four trials was positively correlated with capacity, even after
controlling for age-related improvements (see Simmering, 2008,
for details).
Following these behavioral results, Simmering (2008) quanti-
tatively fit the model’s performance to children’s and adults’ results
from both tasks, in order to understand how the same mem-
ory system could produce such different estimates across tasks.
The model was indeed able to maintain more items in WM dur-
ing the change preference versus change detection task. As such,
Simmering concluded that the infant task did not over-estimate
capacity, but actually produced higher capacity than the change
detection task. The same model showing different capacity – not
just estimates, but the actual number of items held in WM –
across tasks illustrates the benefit of conceptualizing capacity as
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a process. Returning to the issues we raised at the beginning of this
paper, alternative interpretations of these results could be that the
looking task reveals a competence that is masked by the change
detection task, or that the tasks tap different underlying mem-
ory systems. Combining the empirical and computational results,
however, support our position that the system organizes in the
task context: storage cannot be separated from the processes that
form and act upon representations, and storage limits are not static
across task contexts.
CHALLENGES FOR THEORIES OF WORKING MEMORY
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
The empirical results in Tables 1–4 illustrate the complex pattern
of WM capacity development: although capacity increases univer-
sally, different stimuli, paradigms, and domains have revealed high
variability in estimates that remains to be explained. Until recently,
the dominant theories of WM capacity development focused on
single-cause explanations for capacity limits and their develop-
mental increase, which we contend are unable to capture the full
range of behavior shown in Tables 1–4. There has already been a
move to theories that consider multiple causal factors (e.g., Towse
and Hitch, 2007; Cowan et al., 2010), but such theories character-
ize processes and storage as separable cognitive components. As an
alternative, we believe that successful theories of WM capacity and
development will re-conceptualize capacity as part of the process
involved in performing various tasks rather than a separable, sta-
tic storage component. Our case studies illustrate how this new
approach can shed light on previously unclear behavioral results.
We are not arguing that existing theories are simply underspeci-
fied. We are arguing for a re-conceptualization of what capacity
estimates truly measure.
We have identified three challenges that we believe theories
must confront in order to provide a comprehensive account of
WM capacity and its development. Our position is that meeting
these challenges will allow our theories to overcome previous lim-
itations and extend our theories beyond the tasks we use in the lab
to realize positive impacts on real world behaviors that relate to
WM capacity.
CHALLENGE 1: SYSTEM COMPONENTS MUST BE SPECIFIED
A central challenge for any theory of WM capacity is to pos-
tulate the components of the cognitive and behavioral systems
under study, and to specify the coupling among those compo-
nents. This is necessary to understand the real-time organization
of the system in the behavioral tasks we use in the laboratory.
Tables 1–4 give estimates of capacity, which researchers derived
through some calculation based on behavior. Across different tasks,
the specific behaviors we measure can differ substantially (e.g.,
serial reproduction of verbal lists, judging each item in a list as
old/new, yes/no comparisons of multi-item visual arrays, pointing
to remembered locations), but we expect these diverse measures to
reveal some common underlying cognitive mechanisms. Consider,
for example, our second case study in which looking behavior in
the change preference task was compared to same/different judg-
ments in the change detection task. Without a formal proposal
regarding the contribution of the items being held in memory
versus the response processes, there would be no foundation for
the predicted relationship between participants’ looking behavior
and their capacity estimates.
By incorporating the specific details of the task designs and
behaviors we measure in the laboratory into our theories, we
can begin to understand how common cognitive and behavioral
processes could produce the wide variety of estimates shown in
Tables 1–4. For example, it is generally accepted that capacity esti-
mates are influenced by attention, processing speed, and inhibition
(e.g., Johnson et al., 2003). How multiple, interacting processes
organize themselves in service of behavior, however, is strongly
influenced by the context. High attentional demands may lead to
lower capacity estimates in one study while simpler stimuli lead to
higher capacity estimates in another. To understand WM capacity
and its development, we must simultaneously consider multiple
contributions to behavior and the capacity estimated from it.
Our case studies above illustrate how such specification may be
achieved through the use of computational models. Implement-
ing multiple behavioral tasks within a single model architecture
requires specifying what the components are, how they are cou-
pled, and how they interact. This can lead to novel behavioral pre-
dictions. For example, in addition to the case studies we described
above, Simmering and Patterson (2012) showed how the devel-
opmental mechanism proposed by Simmering (2008) to capture
visual WM capacity development also predicts improvements in
color discrimination in a single item memory task. Note that we
are not proposing that computational models are necessary for a
rigorous approach to understanding the link between cognition
and behavior; rather, we emphasize keeping a tight link between
theories and experiments with particular attention on real-time
behaviors.
CHALLENGE 2: THEORIES MUST BE LINKED CLOSELY TO REAL-TIME
BEHAVIOR
Theories of WM capacity and its development cannot evolve with-
out a tight connection between theory and experiment. The work
of Karmiloff-Smith and colleagues provides several elegant exam-
ples (from other domains of cognitive development) of how this
may be accomplished without the use of computational mod-
els. For example, Paterson et al. (2006) assessed numerical skills
across populations by testing multiple age groups with multiple
behavioral tasks. Their results showed that assumptions about
infant processing based on adult dissociations were not supported.
Rather, understanding the cognitive and behavioral processes
involved in each task at each point in development revealed
how processing styles diverged between groups over development.
This example illustrates how non-computational approaches can
still achieve the necessary level of specificity to explain behavior
across multiple tasks and populations, and that new insights can
be gained by considering cognitive and behavioral processes in
context.
Although there will always be a place in our science for the types
of measures reported in Tables 1–4, we believe new methods of
analysis hold great promise in providing new insights into develop-
mental changes into cognitive processes. One example of this type
of approach across domains is to consider “micro-behaviors” –
that is, behavioral indices of underlying cognitive processes that
can be found in the fine details of real-time behavior – rather than
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macro-level measures like percent correct. In the context of our
own case studies, we have demonstrated how looking dynamics
(i.e., switching between displays) may be a more sensitive measure
of capacity than looking preference alone. But even this measure is
relatively coarse, and does not tell us about the temporal unfold-
ing of switches and duration of each fixation across the course of a
trial. These measures might be informative about the link between
online cognitive processing and behavior.
Taking advantage of the richness of behavioral data promises
to drive the study of WM capacity forward. This approach has
led to new insights into infant habituation. For example, Perone
and Spencer (2012) showed that the duration of looks at a stimulus
early in learning structured the time course of memory formation.
This, in turn, influenced the duration of looks later in learning. The
details of fixation, then, provide meaningful information about the
underlying process of forming a memory and how memory forma-
tion impacts fixation dynamics, above and beyond classic measures
associated with habituation. In work with adults, Spivey (2007)
has demonstrated how the real-time dynamics of decision mak-
ing (measured through movements of the eyes and/or computer
mouse in lab tasks) reveal probabilistic representations when overt
behavioral measures (e.g., which item on the screen the partici-
pant clicked) could be interpreted as deterministic. This emphasis
on the fine details of behavior presents a challenge to researchers
because it will require new ways of collecting and analyzing data.
CHALLENGE 3: INTEGRATION ACROSS TYPES OF STIMULI – VERBAL
AND VISUO-SPATIAL – AND TASKS – SIMPLE AND COMPLEX
Historically, the separation of verbal and visuo-spatial memory
systems has been widely accepted. At the very least, visual WM
tasks typically require looking at images or events (e.g., colored
squares, hand movements to blocks) and verbal WM tasks typi-
cally require reading or hearing stimuli (e.g., words, letters, digits).
Critically, however, Tables 1–3 show that visual and verbal WM can
both be characterized by a universal increase in capacity estimates
and cross-task variation in capacity estimates. Should we interpret
this as parallel changes in unrelated systems, or evidence for shared
processes across different types of stimuli? Can we reunite verbal
and visual subsystems?
From a systems view, much of this work will be done by spec-
ifying the relevant components of the system (as described in
Challenge 1). For example, many theories posit separate storage
for verbal versus visuo-spatial information, but shared attentional
mechanisms that influence encoding into these stores (e.g., Cowan
et al., 2005). However, as illustrated by our example above of Isaacs
and Vargha-Khadem’s (1989) study of backward digit and Corsi
spans, it seems that this relationship will not be straight-forward:
their results suggested that the process of manipulating item order
was not comparable for verbal versus visuo-spatial stimuli. As we
argue above, the processes that act upon stored information cannot
be considered separately from the information being stored.
A related concern is where (and whether) to draw the line sep-
arating simple and complex tasks. The typical argument for this
distinction emphasizes the need for processes other than storage
in complex tasks. However, across the range of studies in Tables 1
and 2, we found that participants were required to encode and
retrieve information in a variety of ways across tasks. As such,
even “simple” tasks depend on more than just storage. Although
these differences across tasks are relatively small compared to the
processes involved in, for example, a counting span task, we argue
that it is still informative to consider these tasks as arising from the
same unified system: demands on some processes may be mini-
mized in simple tasks, but these processes still exist and contribute
to performance.
One compelling argument to consider simple and complex
tasks separately is raised by Engle and colleagues (e.g., Shipstead
et al., 2010). They emphasize that simple tasks do not correlate
consistently with performance outside the lab, and suggests that
simple tasks are therefore less informative for understanding indi-
vidual differences and interventions. If we consider simple and
complex tasks as part of the same self-organizing system, how-
ever, then we could use the differences between the task types as
an indication of the processes that are most critical to measures
of general intelligence. For example, Unsworth and Engle (2007)
showed that performance on supraspan trials of simple tasks is
maximally predictive of general fluid intelligence, whereas perfor-
mance on complex tasks is maximally predictive at small spans.
To us, this suggests that both types of tasks are dependent upon
the same underlying system which organizes differently accord-
ing to context. How this organization occurs in response to the
task context may be just as important to understanding individual
differences and/or interventions as understanding how the system
operates in each context separately.
RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: WHAT IS THE GOAL OF OUR THEORIES?
What do we want, or need, to achieve with theories of WM capac-
ity? To date, our theories have often been limited to specific tasks,
domains, and developmental periods. Might there be an advan-
tage to develop theories with a broader goal in mind? We think the
answer is yes. We contend that developing theories with broader
goals will ultimately provide us with a deeper scientific under-
standing of the systems we study. Moreover, we contend that
developing theories with broader goals will have practical impli-
cations in the real world. Consider WM training programs as one
example. These involve intensive exercises designed to improve
WM capacity. The target outcome of such programs is to improve
cognitive functioning in the real world by reducing memory lapses,
improve scholastic achievement, limit symptoms for those suffer-
ing from ADHD, and even increase intelligence (for review of the
claimed benefits of one particular training program, see Shipstead
et al., 2012).
Within the past few years, numerous reviews of WM train-
ing programs have emerged, highlighting this as a central goal of
research on WM capacity (e.g.,Shipstead et al.,2010; Melby-Lervåg
and Hulme, 2012; Wass et al., 2012). Many of these reviews have
reached the pessimistic conclusion that the evidence for WM train-
ing that achieves the intended broad, positive impact on cognitive
function is mixed at best. What is the source of this pessimism?
Our survey of Shipstead et al. (2012) review of the Cogmed WM
training program and the related commentaries points to the cen-
tral assumption underlying the development of such programs:
capacity is a property of the WM system (for discussion, see Logie,
2012; see also Klingberg, 2012). If WM capacity can be enhanced,
then individuals should exhibit benefits across the wide array of
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contexts that this property operates within. However, the evidence
indicates that WM training has limited transfer, with the primary
benefit on tasks that closely resemble the training tasks. Indeed,
some have argued that improved performance on such tasks may
arise from nothing more than familiarity with the task or even per-
forming tasks on computers, and is not an effect of WM capacity
at all (Hulme and Melby-Lervåg, 2012).
Even more worrisome is the fact that our current theories do
not reliably predict which tasks will show transfer of WM train-
ing. Our view echoes that of Gibson et al. (2012), that our theories
and WM training studies must inform each other. Moreover, we
must have theoretically motivated research that specifies how WM
training impacts the WM system and how the WM system is inte-
grated with other cognitive and behavioral systems across contexts
(Hulme and Melby-Lervåg, 2012; Shipstead et al., 2012). Finally,
we must move our theories beyond a single task, domain, and
developmental period in order to explain – and predict – how
WM changes within an individual over time (Gibson et al., 2012).
If we do not understand how the tasks we use in the lab relate to
one another, we will not be able to predict when training in lab
tasks will produce lasting improvements in behaviors outside of
the lab.
CONCLUSION
Working memory capacity plays an important role in numerous
cognitive functions and continuously serves behavior in the real
world. Limitations in WM capacity impact cognition and develop-
ment in both typical and atypical populations. The vast literature
on WM capacity development has revealed a nearly universal
increase in capacity estimates over development and substantial
variation in capacity estimates across task contexts within age
groups. We contend that theoretical explanations focusing on sin-
gle or separable mechanistic sources of children’s performance in
WM tasks or development changes in capacity limits cannot pro-
vide an adequate account of the full pattern of performance shown
in Tables 1–4.
We began by presenting five questions that arose from our sur-
vey of the literature on estimates of capacity development, which
raised possible explanations for the wide variation in results in
Tables 1–4. As we have described above, we reject these poten-
tial explanations and propose a new approach to studying WM
capacity development. In summary, we do not believe that differ-
ent tasks are tapping capacity in different ways, that difficult tasks
are masking underlying competencies, or that capacity can only
be understood by developing a single “best” paradigm to use for
comparisons. Furthermore, we do not think that existing theo-
ries could account for the breadth of data by incorporating more
causal mechanisms and/or being more specific. Rather, we argue
that capacity does not exist in the way it has been traditionally
conceptualized, but is an emergent process within a dynamically
coupled, self-organizing cognitive, and behavioral system.
We propose that WM capacity should be construed as a
dynamic process rather than a property of WM, and that we will
gain better understanding of developmental change by first consid-
ering how the relevant cognitive and behavioral systems organize
in service of tasks within and outside the laboratory, and second,
by examining how changes in real-time dynamics create the devel-
opmental change we observe. We illustrated how Perone et al.
(2011) used such an approach to provide insights into variation in
capacity estimates across contexts and development improvement
in performance during infancy. Furthermore, Simmering (2008,
under review) showed how differences in the method of presen-
tation and behavioral measures across paradigms could result in
higher or lower capacity within the same individuals. Critically,
performance was correlated across these tasks, supporting the
claim that these tasks depend on the same underlying cognitive
system.
Finally, we considered three significant challenges that arise
when conceptualizing WM capacity as a dynamic process within
an integrated system. To develop an effective systems theory of
any cognitive process, not just WM capacity, we must specify the
system components and how they operate across behavioral tasks
while keeping a tight link between theories of how those processes
work and the paradigms we use to test such processes. Within
WM research more specifically, we urge theorists to integrate stud-
ies across verbal and visuo-spatial domains as well as simple and
complex tasks, to arrive at a more complete understanding of the
WM system’s self-organization. By confronting these challenges
we believe that theories of WM capacity development will be able
to expand beyond laboratory tasks and understand the role WM
plays in the great variety of real world behaviors of interest across
both typical and atypical populations.
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APPENDIX
Here we provide a complete list of articles we reviewed for this
paper, with a list of which experiments were included or excluded
and why. First, the following papers have data included in Tables 1–
4. For all papers included, mean ages of children, along with either
standard deviation or range, are reported when available. Second,
we list papers that were entirely excluded, grouped by the reasons
for exclusion.
Papers with data included:
1. Bayliss et al. (2005a). In a single experiment, 56 children
(M age= 8.01 years, range= 7.01–9.00) participated in a four
complex span tasks, two processing tasks, and two storage
tasks. Results from the two storage tasks – digit span and
Corsi block span – are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Results
from the complex span tasks are reported in Table 4. For these
tasks, processing and storage episodes were interleaved; both
types of episodes could be verbal or visuo-spatial, resulting in
four task types of the combined processing and storage types.
Stimuli were nine colored squares that were either large or
small. In the verbal processing task, children named a word
commonly associated with the color (e.g., green= grass). In
the visuo-spatial processing task, children searched for a tar-
get square (one of the large squares that included a beveled
edge). The storage tasks were digit span (verbal) and Corsi
block (visuo-spatial). List length (including both processing
and storage episodes) increased after three successive correct
trials; span scores were calculated as the average length on the
last three correctly recalled trials.
2. Bayliss et al. (2005b). A single experiment included 40 children
in each of three age groups at 6 years (M = 6.02, range= 5.08–
6.07), 8 years (M = 8.04, range= 7.11–9.01), and 10 years
(M = 10.03, range= 9.09–10.10). Children completed two
sessions: in the first, they performed two tasks measuring pro-
cessing efficiency and two measuring storage capacity; in the
second session, two tasks measured complex span, two mea-
sured basic speed, and two measured rehearsal speed. Results
from the two measures of storage capacity – digit span and the
Corsi block task – are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The com-
plex span tasks were as described above (2005), except only
with the same domain (verbal versus visuo-spatial) across
both processing and storage tasks; results are reported in
Table 4.
3. Case et al. (1982). Experiment 1 tested 12 3-year-
olds (M = 3.1, SD= 2.9 months), 10 4-year-olds (M = 3.10,
SD= 2.5 months), 9 5-year-olds (M = 5.1, SD= 1.9 months),
9 6-year-olds (M = 6.1, SD= 3.2 months) on a word span
task, which is reported in Table 1. Experiments 2 and 4 tested
adults and are therefore excluded. Experiment 3 tested 84 chil-
dren, 12 each at grades K (M = 6.0 years, SD= 1.6 months),
1 (M = 6.9 years, SD= 2.2 months), 2 (M = 7.8 years,
SD= 2.5 months), 3 (M = 8.9 years, SD= 2.0 months), 4
(M = 9.9 years, SD= 0.85 months), 5 (M = 10.9 years, SD=
3.5 months), and 6 (M = 12 years, SD= 2.4 months), on a
complex counting span task. In this task, children counted
dots in sequential visual arrays, then held the results of these
counts in memory; results are reported in Table 4.
4. Chi (1977). Experiment 1 tested six 5-year-olds’ memory for
arrays of two to five faces, manipulating familiarity across
conditions within subjects. Responses were scored twice, once
counting faces that maintained the correct spatial layout, and
once with layout irrelevant; both are reported in Table 2.
For the conditions where spatial layout was irrelevant in the
responses, scores increased with set size. Estimates reported
here correspond to the highest set size tested (five faces).
5. Cowan et al. (2011). A single experiment included 90 par-
ticipants, 30 in each of three age groups: third-graders (M
age= 7.67 years, range= 6.3–9.0), sixth- to seventh-graders
(M age= 12.42, range= 11.2–13.5), and adults (whose results
are excluded from Table 4). Participants viewed a 4× 3 grid
on a computer screen in which four objects were sequentially
presented in different squares of the grid (500 ms per item,
with 500 ms delays between items). Two objects were circles
and two were triangles; each object could take on one of nine
colors without replacement across objects within a trial. Fol-
lowing the presentation of the to be remembered items, a
probe display showed the grid with a single item (circle or tri-
angle) that could match one of the memory items in both color
and location, just color, or just location. The participant’s task
was to indicate whether the item matched exactly or one or
both color and location were different. Before the task, half of
the participants were told to attend to only circles, the other
half to only triangles; both types of items were tested for all
participants, but most trials tested the shapes to be attended.
Only results from attended items are reported in Table 4, as
performance on unattended items was not reported as capac-
ity. Across trial blocks, participants were instructed to remain
silent during item presentation, to name the color of each item
following its presentation, or say “wait” following each items’
presentation. These three trial types are reported separately
in Table 4. Capacity was estimated using the equation from
Cowan (2001).
6. Cowan et al. (2005). Experiment 1 tested 37 third-graders
(M age= 8.79 years, SD= 5.36 months), 37 fifth-graders (M
age= 10.72 years, SD= 5.85 months), and 63 adults in seven
tasks across two sessions. Experiment 2 tested 29 second-
graders (M age= 8.29 years, SD= 4.97 months,), 36 fourth-
graders (M age= 10.10 years, SD= 7.54 months), 33 sixth-
graders (M age= 11.92 years, SD= 5.81 months), and 29
adults in nine tasks across two session. Tables 1 and 2 include
results from auditory sequences span (sine-wave tones; Exper-
iment 2 only), digit span, and visual arrays (color change
detection), with results averaged across experiments for 8-
and 10-year-olds children (adults’ data are excluded). Table 4
includes four complex tasks, again with results averaged across
experiments for 8- and 10-year-olds children (adults’ data
are excluded): counting span (described above; Case et al.,
1982), listening span, running memory span, and memory for
ignored speech. In the listening span task, children listened to
spoken sentences and judged each as true of false as well as
remembering the final word of the sentence for later recall.
Capacity is estimated as the number of final words the child
later recalled. The running span task presents auditory digits
at 0.25 s each, for lists of 12–20 items. At the end of a list,
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participants reported the last five, six, or seven items from
the list, in forward order. This task differs from standard digit
span because participants do not know when the list will end,
thus they do not know which digits will need to be reported.
In the ignored speech task, children listened to auditory dig-
its while completing a silent game in which they had to select
rhymes from among pictures presented on a computer screen.
At random intervals, a trial of the rhyme game was replaced
by instructions to recall as many auditory digits as possible.
7. Cowan et al. (2006a). Experiment 1 tested 18 children (M
age= 8.51 years, SD= 3.62 months) and 18 adults in a digit
span task with varying rates of stimulus presentation. These
conditions did not significantly affect the number of items
recalled, so children’s averaged results are presented in Table 1;
adults’ results are excluded.
8. Cowan et al. (2006b). A single experiment tested 52 children
(M age= 10.83 years, SD= 5.18 months) and 52 adults in six
tasks: (1) an auditory digit span test, (2) a visual letter span
test, (3) a dual-task to measure capacity, in which auditory
digits and visual letters were presented together, (4) a visual
array task to measure capacity, (5) a vocabulary test, and (6) a
pattern-analysis test. Children’s results from tasks 1, 2, and 4
are reported in Tables 1 and 2; task 2 is repeated across tables,
as it is unclear whether children recoded the stimuli verbally.
Task 3 included conditions in which children were instructed
to preferentially attend to or ignore one modality or the other;
results are reported in Table 4.
9. Cowan et al. (2010). A single experiment included 90 partici-
pants, 30 in each of three age groups: first- to second-graders
(range= 7–8 years), sixth- to seventh-graders (range= 12–
13 years), and adults (whose results are excluded from
Table 4). The task was similar to that described for Cowan
et al. (2011) above with third exceptions. First, the memory
items were presented simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Second, rather than attending to only one shape across all
trials, participants were instructed to attend to one or both
across trial blocks. Third, the proportion of probe trials that
tested the attended versus unattended items varied. In “1-
shape” blocks, all items in the memory array were the same
shape as each other (the attended shape); thus all probe items
had to be the attended shape. In “100–0%” blocks, half of the
items in the memory array were the attended shape and half
were the unattended shape, and the probed item was always
the attended shape. In the “80–20%” blocks, memory arrays
were again half attended and half unattended, but probe items
were the attended shape on 80% of trials (with 20% prob-
ing the unattended shape). Similarly, in the “50–50%” blocks,
the attended and unattended shapes were equally likely to be
probed. Capacity was estimated separately for each trial block,
as well as for different numbers of memory items (two or three
per shape) using the equation from Cowan (2001). Table 4
reports capacity estimates separately for trials with two versus
three shapes and each trial type; note that 20% trials were the
trials probing the unattended shape in the 80–20% block.
10. Cowan et al. (1999). A single experiment included 24 first-
graders (M age= 7.41 years, SD= 3.73 months), 24 fourth-
graders (M age= 10.24 years, SD= 5.22 months), and 24
adults (whose results are excluded from Tables 1 and 4). Par-
ticipants were tested on four tasks: a digit span pretest, an
auditory-only task, a visual-only task, and a visual-auditory
task. For the pretest, digits were presented at one per second
beginning with a list length of three digits. After the partic-
ipant correctly recalled any list(s) at this length, the length
was increased by one digit; trials proceeded in this manner
until the participant could not correctly recall any lists at
that length, or a maximum length of nine digits was reached.
Span was considered the longest list length repeated correctly,
and is reported in Table 1. Each participant’s span estimate
from this task was used to design span-relative list lengths for
subsequent trials: span, span-1, span-2, and span-3.
The auditory-only task was similar to the pretest, except that
participants were tested on these span-relative lengths. These
results are reported as attended digits in Table 1. From these
results, the authors also compared performance across partici-
pants on a single list length to, see if the length of the presented
list constrained performance; these results were reported as
mean number correct, rather than a span estimate, and are
therefore excluded from Table 1. For the visual-only task was
a picture naming task that did not yield a span measure; it
was included to familiarize participants with the second part
of the task required for the visual-auditory task. In this dual-
task, participants heard the same lists as in the auditory-only
task but were instructed to ignore it and attend instead to the
visual picture naming task. Results from this task are reported
in Table 4. Results for attended and unattended lists were note
reported in the text, but had to be estimated from Figure 1;
we estimated span as the highest number correct across span
lengths.
11. Cowan et al. (2006c). Experiment 1 tested 32 third-
graders (M age= 8.63 years, SD= 0.36), 32 sixth-graders (M
age= 11.93 years, SD= 0.36), and 32 college students in five
tasks measuring (1) verbal-to-spatial mapping, (2) spatial
span, (3) name span, (4) counting span, and (5) running
span. Results were reported as both the maximum span length
children got correct and the sum of span lengths; given that
children completed different numbers of trials, we report only
the maximum. Spatial and name spans are reported in Tables 1
and 2, with adults excluded. Note that, unlike most verbal span
tasks, in the name span task stimuli were presented visually
and children were tested by presenting all possible names and
asking them to arrange the ones that had been presented in
the correct order. Results of the verbal-to-spatial mapping
task were not reported as capacity estimates and are there-
fore not included in Table 4. The counting and running span
tasks were similar to those described above (respectively: Case
et al., 1982; Cowan et al., 2005), and are reported in Table 4.
Experiment 2, which tested only college students, is excluded.
12. de Ribaupierre and Bailleux (1994). A longitudinal study
included 120 children (30 per age group) aged 5, 6, 7, 8, and
10 years at the study onset; children were tested once each
year, within 2 months of their birthday, over 5 years. Results
are based on the 100 children who contributed data each year
(n= 27, 22, 28, and 23, respectively). At each test session, chil-
dren completed two tasks assessing visuo-spatial with a “Mr.
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Peanut” figure that could have colored dots appearing at spec-
ified locations over his body. In the first task, dots were the
same color and children had to remember their locations. In
the second task, each dot was a different color, and children
had to remember both locations and color-location bindings.
Results of these tasks are reported in Tables 2 and 4, respec-
tively; note that results are averaged across cohorts when they
were tested at the same age (i.e., the mean for 8 years includes
data from children who began the study at 5, 6, 7, and 8 years).
13. de Ribaupierre et al. (1989). A single experiment included 192
children: 42 each at 5, 6, 8, and 10 years, and 12 each at 7
and 9 years; all children were tested within 2 months of their
birthdays. The procedure was the same as in de Ribaupierre
and Bailleux (1994), testing memory for locations or color-
location bindings in the “Mr. Peanut” task; again, results are
reported in Tables 2 and 4, respectively.
14. DeMarie and Ferron (2003). A single experiment tested 185
children across multiple sessions; ages were calculated on the
first day of testing. The final sample included 28 kindergarten-
ers (M age= 5.58 years), 35 first-graders (M age= 6.92 years),
43 second-graders (M age= 8.08 years), 30 third-graders (M
age= 9.0 years) and 43 fourth-graders (M age= 10.0 years).
All children completed a battery of tasks measuring a variety
of cognitive processes; of relevance here are only two word
span tasks (animals or clothing, reported together) and one
digit span task, which are included in Table 1.
15. Dempster (1981). This paper reviewed pervious research on
capacity development, and presented mean data in separate
figures for digit span, word span, and letter span. Table 1
includes estimates derived from these figures. Note that stud-
ies included in Dempster’s review are not otherwise included
here.
16. Engle and Marshall (1983). A single experiment tested 24 first-
graders (M age= 6.8 years, SD= 0.38), 24 sixth-graders (M
age= 11.9 years, SD= 0.28), and 24 adults in a digit span
task manipulating presentation time and grouping. Table 1
includes only children’s data from the “ungrouped” condition,
separated by presentation rates.
17. Gilchrist et al. (2009). A single experiment tested 25
first-graders (M = 7.73 years, SD= 0.21), 26 sixth-graders
(M = 12.43 years, SD= 0.39) and 24 adults. Participants were
presented with lists of words organized in sentences (short or
long) or random pseudo-sentences. Because the primary goal
of presenting words organized as sentences was to encourage
chunking words into sentences, which then become the unit of
memory, these conditions are excluded from Table 1; adults’
results are also excluded.
18. Halford et al. (1994). Experiment 1 tested 24 9-year-olds
(M= 9.33, range= 8.83–9.83). Children were shown six cards
containing familiar words at the beginning of the trial and
asked to read them aloud from left to right. Next, they
performed an unrelated task that required either subtract-
ing or reading numbers (between subjects). Finally, they
were presented with the six cards from the beginning of
the trial and asked to arrange them in the original order.
The mean number correct across trials was reported as span,
and is included in Table 4. Experiment 2 tested 40 children
(M = 9.83 years, range= 8.42–11.67) in a similar task: chil-
dren were presented with an auditory list of digits to begin
the trial, then given a transitive inference problem as the sec-
ondary task (with a between subjects manipulation of the
problem presentation). After solving the problem, they were
asked to repeat back the digits in the original order. The
number of digits was increased following correct trials to
reach a span estimate, which is reported in Table 4. Exper-
iment 3 tested 16 5-year-olds (M = 5.5, range= 5.0–5.92),
16 9-year-olds (M = 9.0, range= 8.58–9.5), and 16 12-year-
olds (M = 12.42, range= 12.0–12.92) in digit span tasks with
and without a counting dual-task; results without the dual-
task are reported in Table 1, and results with the dual-task
are reported in Table 4. Experiment 4 tested 20 8-year-olds
(M= 8.33, range= 8.0–8.92) and 20 12-year-olds (M= 12.33,
range= 12.0–13.17) in three types of dual-tasks, within sub-
jects: counting forward, counting backward, and listening to
a story; results are reported in Table 4.
19. Hamilton et al. (2003). Study 1 tested 30 5- to 7-year-olds
children (M = 6.5 years, SD= 0.95), 30 8- to 10-year-olds
children (M = 9.4 years, SD= 0.92), 30 11- to 13-year-olds
children (M = 12.1 years, SD= 0.7), and 30 adults in visual
span, spatial span, speech articulation, and verbal fluency
tasks. Only children’s results from the visual and spatial span
tasks are reported in Table 2. Study 2 tested 78 6- to 9-year-
olds children (M = 7.9 years, SD= 1.07) and 39 adults in the
visual and spatial span tasks with five conditions manipu-
lating interference during the delay period. Children’s results
from only the no-interference/control condition are reported
in Table 2.
20. Hitch et al. (1988). Experiment 1 included 36 5-year-olds
(M = 5.5, range= 5.0–6.0) and 18 10-year-olds (M = 10.5,
range= 10.17–11.08). Children viewed sequences of line
drawings (three for 5-year-olds, five for 10-year-olds), then
reported the item name as the experimenter pointed to the
locations where the drawings had been presented. All chil-
dren completed three types of tasks: similar (in which pictures
visually resembled one another), long names (three syllables,
not visually similar), and control (monosyllabic, not visually
similar). Half of the 5-year-olds were told to name the pic-
tures when they were first presented, while the remaining 5-
and 10-year-olds were instructed to remain silent. Results are
included in Table 1.
Experiment 2 included 24 5-year-olds (M = 5.2, range= 4.83–
5.92) and 24 10-year-olds (M = 10.75, range= 10.25–11.25).
This procedure was identical to the control condition from
Experiment 1 except that children were asked to name the
drawing immediately after its presentation, as soon as it was
out of view. Additionally, on half of the trials children were
asked to recall in the same order as the items were presented,
while the other half of trials were recalled in the opposite
order; Table 2 includes the forward repetition, Table 3 includes
the backward repetition. In this experiment, results were pre-
sented in a figure as percent correct across serial order, from
which we estimated the average number correct for each age
group. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 tested the effects of interference
and are not included here.
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21. Hitch et al. (1989). Experiment 1 included 18 5-year-
olds (M = 5.25 years, range= 4.75–5.67) and 36 11-year-olds
(M = 10.83 years, range= 10.33–11.25); half of the 11-year-
olds were assigned to an articulatory suppression condition,
which is excluded from Table 2. Children remembered sets of
drawings that were visually similar, had phonemically similar
names, or were dissimilar in both ways (control). Experi-
ments 2 and 3 tested effects of retroactive interference and
did not report mean number correct/capacity estimates, and
are therefore excluded from Table 2.
22. Hulme et al. (1984). Experiment 1 included nine partici-
pants in each of four age groups: 3–4 years (M = 4.08 years,
range= 3.58–4.25), 7–8 years (M = 7.80 years, range= 7.17–
8.08), 10–11 years (M = 10.88 years, range= 10.33–11.5), and
adults. Experiment 2 included 18 8-year-olds (M = 8.47 years,
range= 8.17–8.83) and 18 10-year-olds (M = 10.63 years,
range= 10.08–10.92). In both experiments, participants’
speech rates were recorded and compared with their mean
number of words recalled per list (six-word lists for adults,
five-word lists for older children, four-word lists for younger
children). Words were short (one syllable), medium (two syl-
lables), or long (three or four syllables), which yielded signif-
icantly different results, with higher spans for shorter words.
Note that the 10- to 11-year-olds from Experiment 1 are listed
as 11 years in Table 2 to differentiate from the 10-year-olds in
Experiment 2.
23. Huttenlocher and Burke (1976). One experiment included
90 preschool children (M age= 4.6 years), 60 first-graders
(M age= 7.0 years), 60 third-graders (M age= 9.2 years), and
60 fifth-graders (M age= 11.0 years). Children were asked to
repeat lists of digits, preserving presentation order. Tempo-
ral grouping was manipulated across lists (within subjects),
and participants were randomly assigned to one of three
types of sound pattern, prosodic, melodic, or monotone;
results reported in Table 1 are averaged across sound pattern
conditions.
24. Hutton and Towse (2001). A single experiment tested 29
8-year-olds (M = 7.58 years, range= 7.08–8.08) and 25 10-
year-olds (M = 10.75 years, range= 10.25–11.25) children in
a digit span task (forward and backward recall, with and
without articulatory suppression) and a counting span task
(forward and backward recall), followed by a series of “ability”
measures (i.e., tests of intelligence and aptitude). Results from
forward recall without suppression are reported in Table 1;
results from backward recall without suppression are reported
in Table 3. All other results are reported in Table 4.
25. Imbo and Vandierendonck (2007). A single experiment
included 21 fourth-graders (M age= 10.0 years), 21 fifth-
graders (M age= 11.08 years), and 21 sixth-graders (M
age= 12.17 years). Children completed a series of tasks assess-
ing math skills, executive functioning, processing speed, and
memory span; only the span task (for digits) is reported in
Table 1.
26. Isaacs and Vargha-Khadem (1989). A single experiment
included 288 children, divided into groups of 32 at each of
nine age levels between 7 and 15 years (inclusive; no further
details of age were given). Children completed digit span tasks,
forward and backward, and the Corsi block task, forward and
backward. In both tasks, the longest string of digits or blocks
which the child recalled correctly at least once was recorded
as that child’s span. Forward versions of the tasks are reported
in Tables 1 and 2; backward versions of both are reported in
Table 3.
27. Kyttälä (2008). A single experiment included 45 ninth-graders
(age range= 15–16 years) who were selected to form three
groups of 15 each: low math/normal reading ability; low
math/low reading ability; and normal ability controls. All stu-
dents completed three “passive” memory tasks – the visual
patterns task, Corsi block task, and “little houses” task (requir-
ing recall of house forms) – and two“active”tasks that required
either drawing from memory or making judgments of lin-
earity from memory. The three passive tasks are reported in
Table 2, separated by student group.
28. Logie and Pearson (1997). A single experiment tested 62
5-year-olds (M = 5.75 years, SD= 3.3 months), 44 8-year-
olds (M = 8.83 years, SD= 3.7 months), and 40 11-year-olds
(M = 11.83 years, SD= 3.9 months) in visual and spatial
tasks. For the visual task, children were presented with a 10-
or 12-square matrix in which half of the squares were filled;
they were then tested on both recognition (yes/no response
to a second matrix) and recall (fill in blank matrix) of the
pattern. The spatial task was a variation of the Corsi block
task, in which nine identical blue blocks were placed in front
of the child, and the experimenter tapped out a sequence of
blocks. Children were again tested on both recognition (yes/no
response to a second tapping sequence by the experimenter)
and recall (tapping blocks themselves) of the sequence.
29. Luciana et al. (2005). A single experiment tested 106 9- to
17-year-olds (M = 13.52 years, SD= 2.82) and 27 18- to 20-
year-olds (excluded from Table 2) in a battery of working
memory tasks. Only two tasks yielded span/capacity estimates,
spatial span forward and backward, based on the Corsi block
task; forward span results are reported in Table 2, backward
span in Table 3.
30. Miller and Vernon (1996). A single experiment tested 109 chil-
dren between 4 and 6 years of age (M = 5.51 years, SD= 0.85).
Children’s intellectual ability was measured and compared
to reaction times in a speed of processing task and a series
of working memory tasks. The working memory tasks are
reported in Tables 1 and 2 and included two color memory
tasks (sequential and simultaneous presentation), two shape
memory tasks (sequential and simultaneous presentation),
and a tone memory task. Capacity was calculated as the high-
est sequence/array sizes at which the child performed correctly
on both trials.
31. Morra (1994). Experiment 1 tested 191 children ranging in
age from 6.0 to 10.92 years; results were reported in groups
for each year of age, although mean ages for each group were
not reported. This study included three sessions with 16 tasks
total, 8 of which yielded span estimates: forward digit span,
backward digit span, forward Corsi block, backward Corsi
block, forward word span, backward word span, counting span
(cf. Case et al., 1982), and the Mr. Cucumber task (compara-
ble to the Mr. Peanut task with color-location bindings as
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology January 2013 | Volume 3 | Article 567 | 22
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simmering and Perone Capacity development
described above; de Ribaupierre and Bailleux, 1994). Results
from the simple/forward tasks were not reported as span esti-
mates, but were only used for correlation and factor loading
analyses. Results from backward tasks are included in Table 3,
and results from the counting span and Mr. Cucumber tasks
are reported in Table 4. Experiment 2 tested 124 children rang-
ing in age from 5.83 to 9.75 years; results were reported for 6-
(M = 6.25), 7- (M = 7.42), 8- (M = 8.42), and 9- (M= 9.33)
year-olds. Participants completed a subset of the tasks from
Experiment 1, including forward and backward digit span,
counting span, and Mr. Cucumber. Reported results (all but
forward digit span) are included in Tables 3 and 4, averaged
with results from Experiment 1 for all age groups but 10-
year-olds (as this age group was not included in Experiment
2).
32. Morra and Camba (2009). A single experiment tested 58
third-graders (age range= 8.08–9.33 years),51 fourth-graders
(age range= 9.17–10.33 years), and 52 fifth-graders (age
range= 10.17–11.25 years) in 13 tasks across two sessions.
Four of these tasks yielded capacity estimates: Mr. Cucum-
ber (similar to the “Mr. Peanut” task described above; see de
Ribaupierre and Bailleux, 1994), counting span, forward digit
span, and backward digit span. These four tasks are included
in Tables 2 (as pattern recall), 4, 1, and 3, respectively. For all
tasks, means were not reported separately by age group.
33. Mutter et al. (2006). A single experiment tested 72 preschool
children (M age= 3.92 years, range= 2.67–5.33) in a varia-
tion of the “Mr. Peanut” task described above (see de Rib-
aupierre and Bailleux, 1994). The Figure had between one and
six colored body parts, with three trials to each level; children
indicated which parts had been colored after a 2 s delay. Capac-
ity was calculated by awarding one-third point for each correct
trial. The task ended when participants answered incorrectly
for all trials at one level.
34. Nichelli et al. (2001). A single experiment included
275 children, divided into seven age groups: 31 5- to
6-year-olds (range= 64–83 months), 50 7-year-olds (84–
95 months), 33 8-year-olds (96–107 months), 47 9-year-olds
(108–119 months), 53 10-year-olds (120–131 months), 36
11-year-olds (132–143 months), and 23 12-year-olds (144–
162 months); mean ages and standard deviations were not
reported. All children completed a spatial span (Corsi) task,
and most also completed a verbal (word) span task (n= 31,
40, 29, 38, 46, 31, and 23, respectively by age). The verbal task
included an immediate span estimate as well as a learning
component; only immediate span is reported in Table 1.
35. Noël (2009). A single experiment included 80 children, 38 in
their second year of Belgian kindergarten (M age= 4.42 years,
SD= 3.9 months, range= 3.92–5.0 years), and 42 in their
third year of Belgian kindergarten (M age= 5.42 years,
SD= 3.9 months, range= 4.83–6.08 years). Children’s mem-
ory capacity was assessed in addition to counting and addition
skills, non-verbal intelligence, and general vocabulary. The
capacity tasks included two verbal span tasks, one for mono-
syllabic words, one for food and animal names, and the Corsi
block task. Recall performance did not differ across the two
types of words, so results are averaged together in Table 1.
36. Orsini et al. (1981). A single experiment included 1113 chil-
dren between the ages of 4 and 10 (no further detail given);
children were classified as “town” or “country” dwelling as
an index of cultural background. All children completed the
Corsi block task and a word span task. Results were pre-
sented separately by gender and by cultural background, but
are averaged together for Tables 1 and 2.
37. Ottem et al. (2007). Study 1 tested 65 third-graders
(M age= 8.5 years, SD= 0.42) and 35 seventh-graders (M
age= 12.5 years, SD= 0.88) on tests of language performance
(serial recall of words) and a non-verbal test of cognitive
performance. Lists of words were classified as being distinct
or similar within lists. Span was computed as the longest
list that the child recalled in the correct order; testing was
terminated when the participant made errors on three con-
secutive lists. Study 2 tested 934 children (range= 6–16 years)
in two language skill tasks and a shortened version of the serial
recall task, again classifying lists as distinct or similar. Results
were reported separately for age groups divided by year (i.e.,
6–7 years, 7–8 years, etc.) without specifying the mean ages
per group. Study 3 included 29 3-year-olds (M = 3.59 years,
SD= 0.34), 50 4-year-olds (M = 4.53 years, SD= 0.27), and
44 5-year-olds (M = 5.47 years, SD= 0.28). Children com-
pleted a shorter version of the serial recall task, again with
distinct or similar words within lists, as well as two tests of
receptive language performance. Results from the list recall
tasks are presented in Table 1, averaged across Studies 1 and 2
for 8- and 12-year-olds.
38. Palmer (2000). Experiment 1 included 12 3-year-olds
(M = 3.58 years, range= 3.08–4.08), 26 6-year-olds (M =
6.00 years, range= 5.42–6.33),28 7-year-olds (M = 7.00 years,
range= 6.42–7.33). Children were randomly assigned to one
of two conditions, control or verbal recoding. All children were
shown 12 trials consisting of series of pictures (lists of three for
3-year-olds, lists of four for 6- and 7-year-olds), and those in
the verbal recoding condition were asked to name them aloud
during encoding. Of the 12 trials, 4 included photos of visually
similar objects, 4 included photos of phonologically similar
objects, and 4 included dissimilar (control) objects. Results
are reported as the mean number of objects identified in the
correct serial position. Experiment 2 included 38 5-year-olds
(M = 5.29 years) and 42 6-year-olds (M = 6.25 years) who
were tested three times in each of three consecutive years (at
final test, n= 34, M = 7.29 years, and n= 39, M = 8.25 years,
respectively). Children were not instructed on whether to ver-
bally encode the objects, and were tested on the same 12
trials from Experiment 1 (all list lengths of four). Results
are reported as the mean number of objects identified in the
correct serial position.
39. Pickering et al. (1998). A single experiment tested 28 5-year-
olds (M = 5.7 years, SD= 2.59 months) and 31 8-year-olds
(M = 8.8 years, SD= 2.15 months) on serial recall of letters,
digits, and blocks. For digit span, only number of correct lists
was reported (not span/capacity estimates), so these results are
excluded from Table 1. For the letter and block tasks, estimates
from two different list lengths are reported for each group; the
averages across lengths are included in Tables 1 and 2.
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40. Riggs et al. (2006). One experiment included 20 children in
each of three age groups: 5-year-olds (M = 5.54 years), 7-year-
olds (M = 7.25 years), and 10-year-olds (M = 10.63 years). All
children completed a color change detection task in which
a memory array included one to five colored squares, fol-
lowed by a short delay and presentation of a test array
with the same number of items. Colors in the test array
were either all identical to the memory array (“same” tri-
als) or one color had changed (“different” trials). Capacity
was estimated for each set size using Pashler’s (1988) formula,
and was averaged across set size for the values reported in
Table 2.
41. Russell et al. (1996). Experiment 1 included three groups of
children: 33 with autism diagnoses, 33 with moderate learning
difficulties, and 33 typically developing (M age= 6.28 years,
SD= 1.19); only results from typically developing children are
reported in Table 1. All children completed a verbal span task
with both short (one syllable) and long (three syllable) words,
using two response types: verbal, in which they reported the
list back in sequence; and non-verbal, in which they pointed,
in sequence, to pictures corresponding to the words in the
list. Span was estimated as the longest list length at which a
child had been correct on at least two of the three trials, with
a further half point credited if the child was correct on one of
the three trials at the next list length. Results from these span
tasks were compared to speed of articulation for both short
and long words.
Experiment 2 tested similar groups, with 22 typically devel-
oping children (M age= 6.85 years, SD= 0.5) in three com-
plex span tasks, within subjects: counting span, sum span,
and the odd-man-out task; each had a “simple” and “com-
plex” form. For the counting span task, the simple form
presented dots in familiar arrangements (i.e., as on dice),
but in unsystematic arrangements for the complex form.
In the sum span task, children were presented visually with
simple addition problems; in the simple form, the answers
were provided with the problem, and in the complex form
children had to generate the answer on their own. The odd-
man-out task included a series of cards with three dots, one
of which was a different than the other two. Children were
required to point to the unique dot and remember its posi-
tion (within a 3× 4 grid) across cards to report, in order, at
the end. In the simple form, the unique dot was black on
every trial; in the complex form, the dots had different pat-
terns on every card. Results from these tasks are reported in
Table 4.
42. Simmering (2012). A single experiment tested 14 3-
year-olds (M = 3.39 years, SD= 2.35 months), 14 4-year-
olds (M = 4.21 years, SD= 1.77 months), 28 5-year-olds
(M = 5.15 years, SD= 3.11 months), and 28 7-year-olds
(M= 7.48 years, SD= 3.08 months) in a color change detec-
tion task. All of the 3- and 4-year-olds and half of the 5-
and 7-year-olds completed a modified version of the task in
which one to five colored squares were presented within a
gray rectangular frame, labeled as “cards” to facilitate younger
children’s understanding of the task. The remaining 5- and 7-
year-olds completed a replication of the task from Riggs et al.
(2006). In both tasks, capacity was estimated for each set size
using Pashler’s (1988) formula; each child’s highest estimate
across set sizes was then averaged across children within each
age group to arrive at estimates reported in Table 2. There were
no significant differences between the modified and replica-
tion versions, so these estimates were averaged together in
Table 2.
43. Towse and Hitch (1995). Experiment 1 tested only adults and
is therefore excluded. Experiment 2 tested 76 children, divided
into four age ranges: 6-year-olds (M = 5.92, range= 5.42–
6.42), 7-year-olds (M = 6.92, range= 6.5–7.42), 8-year-olds
(M = 7.92, range= 7.5–8.42) and 10-year-olds (M = 10.75,
range= 10.17–11.33). Children completed a counting span
task (Case et al., 1982) with three trial types. On feature tri-
als, cards included blue target (i.e., to be counted) squares
and orange non-target (i.e., to be ignored) triangles. On con-
junction trials, cards include blue target squares and blue
non-target triangles. On feature-slow trials, cards were simi-
lar to the feature trials, but with larger numbers of items (i.e.,
6–10 rather than 3–7). Span was measured as the number of
counting results children retained across trials and reported
correctly at the end of trials; note that counting errors were
ignored, such that recalling an incorrect count was consid-
ered correct. Results are reported separately for trial types in
Table 4.
44. Towse et al. (1998). Experiment 1 included 67 children divided
into four age groups: 6-year-olds (M = 6.9, range= 6.3–7.2),
7-year-olds (M= 7.8, range= 7.3–8.1), 9-year-olds (M= 9.9,
range= 9.4–10.2), and 10-year-olds (M= 10.5, range= 10.2–
11.1). Children performed a counting span task similar to the
feature condition described in Towse and Hitch (1995), with
small and large number of items per card alternating within
trials. Across trials, whether the trial began with a small ver-
sus large number was counter-balanced, and the final card in
the sequence was always opposite (i.e., small first card, large
final card). Results were reported separately for these trials
types in Table 4. Experiment 2 included 55 children divided
into three age groups: 8-year-olds (M= 7.11, range= 7.5–
8.4), 10-year-olds (M= 10.1, range= 9.5–10.5), and 11-year-
olds (M= 10.1, range= 10.5–11.5). Children were tested in
an operation span task in which they performed a simple
addition or subtraction problem and retained the result for
later recall. The length of problems was varied (short= two
terms, intermediate= three terms, long= four terms), and
results were reported separately depending on the length of
the final problem in the set, as shown in Table 4. Exper-
iment 3 tested 65 children divided into three age groups:
8-year-olds (M= 8.4, range= 7.1–8.9), 9-year-olds (M= 9.3,
range= 8.1–9.8), and 10-year-olds (M= 10.3, range= 9.8–
10.8). Across two counter-balanced sessions, children per-
formed an operation span task as in Experiment 2, as well
as a reading span task in which children had to read a sen-
tence and fill in a blank for the final word; the final words
were then retained for recall. As in the other tasks, the length
of sentences was manipulated. Results are reported in Table 4
(with operation span results averaged across Experiments 2
and 3 for 8- and 10-year-olds).
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45. Towse et al. (2002). Experiments 1 tested 7- to 17-year-
olds children in an interpolated digit span task (requiring
arithmetic between items to be remembered) but did not
report span estimates. Similarly, Experiment 2 tested 8- and
10-year-olds children in an interpolated word or digit span
task (requiring lexical decision tasks between items to be
remembered) but did not report span estimates. Experiment
3 included 25 children (M age= 10.0 years, range= 9.67–
10.5) were given four digits to recall on each trial, with
one of two interpolated processing tasks (between partici-
pants). In the two-choice task, children reported either the
parity of a number (even/odd) or the accuracy of an arith-
metic sum for the interpolated task. In the four-choice task,
participants were required to consider both parity and accu-
racy in conjunction. Results were reported as the number
of digits (out of four) correctly reported in order at the
end of each trial with short (6 s) versus long (15 s) delays
resulting from the interpolated task, and are included in
Table 4.
46. Vicari et al. (2003). Experiment 1 included 193 chil-
dren divided into the following age groups: 23 5-year-
olds (M = 5.5 years, SD= 0.3), 34 6-year-olds (M = 6.5 years,
SD= 0.3), 38 7-year-olds (M = 7.5 years, SD= 0.4), 39
8-year-olds (M = 8.42 years, SD= 0.3), 32 9-year-olds
(M = 9.58 years, SD= 0.4), and 27 10-year-olds (M
age= 10.42 years, SD= 0.3). All children completed both spa-
tial and visual span tasks. For the spatial task, a grid of nine
blocks (similar to the Corsi task) appeared on a computer
screen, and an abstract geometric shape appeared on one
block, disappeared, then reappeared on another block, and so
on to comprise spans of one to six blocks. Children reproduced
the sequence of blocks on which the shape had appeared. For
the visual task, a series of one to six non-definable geometric
figure appeared in the middle of the computer screen, sepa-
rated by a short delay. For test, a set of nine figures appeared
and the participant indicated which matched the original
figure(s) in the order of presentation. Experiment 2 used the
same task with children with William Syndrome; these results
are excluded.
47. Wagner and Jackson (2006). A single experiment included
120 children, 40 each from kindergarten (M age= 6 years
SD= 0.39), first grade (M age= 7 years, SD= 0.30), and
third grade (M age= 9 years, SD= 0.36). Children were ran-
domly assigned to two “scanning” groups, in which they
were instructed to use different visual scanning strategies
to encode items for a span task using picture communi-
cation symbols. Pictures were presented in a 4× 3 grid,
and participants were required to recall which picture was
where. Span was estimated as the highest number of pic-
tures correctly retrieved across trials including 2–10 pic-
tures, irrespective of location errors. Results, averaged across
scanning conditions, are reported in Table 2 (note that
the authors reported results as “word span,” but we chose
to include them with other visuo-spatial tasks because
the stimuli and responses used pictures rather than verbal
words).
48. Wilson et al. (1987). Four groups of 18 children each were
tested in a single experiment: 5-year-olds (M = 5.33 years,
SD= 2.47 months), 7-year-olds (M = 7.5 years, SD=
3.46 months),11-year-olds (M = 11.42 years,SD= 3.4 months),
and adults (data excluded). Participants completed a pattern
span task over retention intervals of 2 or 10 s, tested with
recognition. An additional condition with interference during
the 10 s retention interval is not included in Table 2.
49. Wynn and Coolidge (2009). A single experiment tested 34
high school students (M age= 16.0 years, range= 15–17) in
two tests of phonological capacity – digit span forward and
backward – and a test of theory of mind. The span tasks con-
tinued until participants failed to recall one string correctly;
span was estimated as the largest number of digits recalled,
separately for forward and backward recall. Results from the
forward and backward span tasks are included in Tables 1 and
3, respectively.
50. Zuber et al. (2009). A single experiment included 130 first-
graders (M age= 7.33 years, SD= 7.1 months, range= 6.4–
8.8 years). Children completed three tasks measuring verbal
memory (letter span), visuo-spatial memory (Corsi block),
and central executive (backward versions of other tasks), for
comparison with performance on number word transcoding.
The forward versions of the tasks are reported in Tables 1 and
2; in both cases, the maximum list length at which a child
correctly recalled two lists was recorded as that child’s span.
Backward versions are reported in Table 3.
The remaining papers were reviewed but excluded entirely from
Tables 1 and 2, for reasons described below.
1. A number of papers included span- or capacity-related tasks,
but reported only number/percent correct, rather than capacity
estimates: Alloway et al. (2005), Alloway et al. (2009), Alloway
et al. (2006), Alloway et al. (2004), Andersson (2010), Ang and
Lee (2010), Arsalidou et al. (2010), Cowan et al. (2010), Das
(1985), Engle et al. (1991), Engel et al. (2008), Gathercole and
Pickering (1999, 2000), Gathercole et al. (2004), Grimley and
Banner (2008), Holmes et al. (2008), Kaufman (2007), Kyttälä
et al. (2003),Marcovitch et al. (2010),Nevo and Breznitz (2011),
Nutley et al. (2010), Oakhill and Kyle (2000), Polderman et al.
(2006), Reuhkala (2001), Walker et al. (1994).
2. Some studies computed capacity estimates for use in correla-
tions, but did not report means: Fry and Hale (1996), Klingberg
et al. (2002), Lehto (1996), Swanson and Berninger (1996),
Whitebread (1999).
3. Other studies tested the same group of children repeatedly in
order to assess learning: Swanson (1996, 1999, 2003).
4. Tasks designed for use with infants and toddlers rely on behav-
ioral measures such as looking preferences or duration of
searching behavior, which may involve processes in addition to
those involved in tasks designed for older children and adults:
Barner et al. (2007), Feigenson and Carey (2003, 2005), Káldy
and Leslie (2005), Oakes et al. (2011), Oakes et al. (2009), Oakes
et al. (2006), Rose et al. (2001), Ross-Sheehy et al. (2003, 2010),
Zosh et al. (2011).
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